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Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Commentary on New Temporary Combined Arms Regulations

93UM0076A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel Gennadiy Miranovich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "The Army Must Live Strictly by the Regulations, Although for Now These Regulations Are Provisional"]

[Text] Many of our readers regard the fact of approval of provisional combined arms regulations by the Russian Federation president as an important move to eliminate the legal vacuum in which servicemen of the Russian Army which is being formed at first found themselves for various reasons, and it is difficult not to agree with them. Because of the parliament's low "productivity" in lawmaking on defense matters, the Russian Army ended up without rights not only on a social plane, but also in purely official matters. We have servicemen who have not seen any regulations with their own eyes inasmuch as the old ones (of the USSR Armed Forces) no longer are in print and new ones do not yet exist.

But this "gap" will be eliminated in the near future. By presidential edict we will be living under provisional Russian Army regulations as of 1 January 1993. Other documents regulating Armed Forces vital activities also will be brought into line with their provisions.

Just what is new that we will see in the regulations which must be printed (publication will cost the Ministry of Defense R10,987,000) and sent out to the troops before 25 December of this year by order of the minister of defense?

As was to be expected, a number of changes are dictated by the Soviet Union's disintegration. All designations and abbreviations connected with its existence naturally are omitted. So the Moscow KOMSOMOLSKO-MOLODEZHNYAYA GAZETA (20 October issue) frightens its readers in vain by passing off old drafts of regulation documents published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA three years ago as Russian Army regulations. We will have neither the generalissimos nor the leading role of the CPSU and so on. And if it happens that a commander (officer in charge) congratulates or thanks us in the line of duty, we will simply answer: "We serve the homeland."

There also are a number of other innovations related by Colonel Pavel Poloz, a member of the working group for preparing combined arms regulations formed in the Ground Forces Main Commissariat. In particular, the Interior Service Regulation sets forth a broad set of measures on creating a reliable mechanism of servicemen's legal and social protection. For example, in performing military duty obligations a serviceman is a representative of state authority from now on. The Regulation stipulates a serviceman's rights, duties and features of conduct in case he is taken prisoner by the enemy which conform to international agreements. The length of the work (duty) week is spelled out precisely for various categories of servicemen. A duty time regulation for officers, warrant officers and servicewomen is being introduced in addition to the daily routine. As we know, there was no such thing in Soviet regulations.

Now the commander (officer in charge) will not be liable for subordinates' crimes and misdeeds if they are not a direct result of his activity or of not taking steps to prevent them. A punishment such as the admonition has been excluded from the Disciplinary Regulation. Soldiers and sailors now can be assigned to a detail out of order only for work and not for duty, as was the case before, and the right to apply this punishment also is granted to junior commanders (from squad commander on up). A regimental commander has the right to discharge extended-term sergeants and petty officers as well as privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers who entered military duty under contract and servicewomen to the reserve before expiration of the term of service as a disciplinary punishment.

And generally it must be noted that the range of commanders' disciplinary practice has been expanded both along the line of punishments as well as commendations. For example, an extra pass from the unit area is authorized for up to 24 hours to commend privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers. In addition to mandatory leave, a first-term serviceman can receive a short leave of up to five days as a commendation. Warrant officers can be promoted ahead of schedule.

By the way, we will not tire the reader by enumerating all provisions in which provisional Russian Army regulations will differ from those presently in force, and there is little newspaper space for this, because substantial changes and additions have been added to the Interior Service Regulation, the Disciplinary Regulation, and the Garrison and Guard Duties Regulation. Perhaps only the Drill Regulation did not undergo significant changes. But here is what I would like to talk about.

Of course, a hair-splitting adherent of the idea of accelerating military organizational development and rapid Armed Forces reform also will find something that will not suit him in the new regulations. Probably they still lack something of the sort that should be inherent to regulations specifically of the Russian Army. Nevertheless... In the opinion of specialists, the new documents reflect modern demands for combat readiness of forces, for organization of duties and educational work with personnel, and for ensuring security of military service and servicemen's social and legal protection. No matter what discussions go on over them, it still is necessary to proceed from an immutable truth: regulations are written to be fulfilled. Introducing them to our everyday life will not just help regulate service and remove many questions involving organization of military collectives' vital activities under new conditions. The demands contained in the new regulations unquestionably will promote a strengthening of discipline and order and a revival of the best traditions of the Russian Armed Forces.

Yes, the regulations are provisional. Of course servicemen, Armed Forces veterans and other citizens will introduce many suggestions for their improvement, but that is what the transition period from provisional to permanently effective regulations is designed for. According to the Russian Federation minister of defense order, their drafts must be ready by 1 March 1995. This period will be used by the Armed Forces Regulation Commission to collect and analyze all opinions and suggestions. It stands to reason that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA also will not stand aloof from this important work.

And so provisional combined arms regulations have been approved. Work on the regulations continues...

Cossacks To Form Contingent in Russian Army

934C0289A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian
No 16, 27 Oct 92 p 14

[Article by Aleksandra Yemtseva and Andrey Rakul: "The Russian Army Will Be Staffed by Cossacks." The article is under the rubric "Conference of Kuban Cossacks.]"

[Text] A Great Cossack Circle—a conference of the highest organ of self-government of the Kuban Cossack Forces—took place on October 24th in Krasnodar. A decision to conduct this meeting was unanimously agreed to on October 17th at the Great Council of Cossack atamans of villages, Kuban cities, and farmsteads that comprise the Kuban Cossack Popular Assembly [Rada].

According to experts of "X," the Kuban Rada and Forces are two of the most influential Cossack organizations in Krasnodar Kray, totaling about 5,000 members each. Moreover, the organization of Kuban Forces has, from the very beginning, actively supported Vasilii Dyakonov, administration chief of Krasnodar Kray. Yevgeniy Nagay, ataman of the forces, was categorically opposed to holding the conference and had spoken out more than once in favor of having the forces and Rada as separate entities. Nonetheless, the decision on holding the Great Circle was unanimously approved by the Great Council.

As one of the "X" experts already reported in our issue of October 23rd, at an expanded meeting of the collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, held on the eve of the Cossack conference, the participants—in accordance with the President's personal order—approved a decision "to work out legislative acts before November 15th and establish a procedure for recruiting Cossacks for active military duty." The collegium also ordered that a stage-by-stage plan and schedule be developed for staffing subunits of the Russian Armed Forces with Cossacks. Inspired by support from the powers that be, the Cossacks' Saturday conference in Krasnodar adopted the slogan: "Together with the President and the Army!" and approved a decision to establish a Cossack contingent within the Russian army. The Great Circle also unanimously supported Admiral Igor Kasatonov's candidacy for Russian deputy. Kasatonov is very popular in the Kuban region because of his position on fate of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, participants in the meeting of the Council of Atamans, held on the eve of the conference, announced that Cossacks "have nothing to do with the candidacy for Russian Deputy, of Nikolay Kondratenko, former party director of Krasnodar Kray," who also has rather strong support in the kray.

The unifying trends of Cossack movements in various regions of Russia, in view of the official support from the military and the President, may lead—according to the experts of "X"—to legalization of the former privileges and rights of Cossacks. If this occurs, they may also be given back the right to permanently wear cold steel—sabers and daggers. This last possibility is evoking appropriate apprehension on the part of law enforcement organs, because even without this new development, they are concerned about the high level of use of unregistered weapons in the republic.

Western Group Commander Burlakov Profiled

93UM0110A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Oct 92 pp 1,2

[Article by Sergey Pashayev and Vadim Markushin: "The 16th Commander-in-Chief"]

[Text] Perhaps the most profound misconception is to judge about the actual tension of life and service in the Western Group of Forces [WGF] based on outwardly serene, pacified Wünsdorf. Especially at that time when the yellow-crimson Brandenburg autumn persistently covers the WGF headquarters' roads and sidewalks with a layer of rustling leaves.

This autumn it is quietest of all at the Officers Club behind the group of forces museum where rows of tanks, self-propelled guns and cannons from the last war have been frozen in a sadly-triumphal formation on pedestals. Only groups of tourists liven up this landscape from time to time. In recent times, they have begun to drop by here from all corners of Germany. What is familiar, usual and old hat for us is, it turns out, a revelation for the Germans. They examine the at one time fearsome military equipment with genuine interest and they stay for a long time at the dioramas of the Battle for the Reichstag, read the yellowed lines of documents, and intently examine the faces of the military leaders who at various times have led the group of forces. Zhukov, Sokolovskiy, Chuykov, Konev...

Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov is the 16th on this list of honor. You don't have to be cunning to know that a man has reason to be proud of this association. Had he thought about this long ago when he was a lieutenant? Did he try on the commander-in-chief's uniform in his cadet's dreams? Yes and no. On the one hand, the unwritten laws of officer service stimulated ambition and, on the other hand, common sense thinking extinguished that ambition: the first military generation in the family, if you don't consider his father who fought at the front and did not live to see the Victory...

Another feeling totally fills him—responsibility. It spurs on and focuses all the energies of his mind and soul.

Burlakov has led the Western Group of Forces at a most historic and dramatic moment. The dynamics of the realization of the political decisions that were made at break-neck speed occurred after they had been made. Very difficult, painful, and fraught with unpredictable complications. And we need to think that he was not selected by chance. One experienced man is worth more than two greenhorns and the former Southern Group of Forces commander has had quite a bit of experience defending his country's legitimate interests. Indeed, the new mission in no way compares with what was carried out in Hungary. Neither our nor any foreign military history has yet known such a redeployment of people, military supplies, vehicles and equipment that our army has faced during the troop withdrawal from Germany. The withdrawal, which had barely begun, was further complicated because the USSR disintegrated and our relations with our former Warsaw Treaty partners have drastically changed. Regiments and divisions that were literally on the march began to receive new addresses. The

fates of thousands and thousands of families of Russian military personnel have been transformed into a constant pain for him.

Those who have assumed the responsibilities of commanders-in-chief have had their own heavy burden in each given historical period. The responsibility for combat readiness held sway over Burlakov's predecessors in the era of the great confrontation, in the direct sense that the Soviet divisions deployed in the GDR [German Democratic Republic] were obliged, if necessary and without the slightest delay, to enter into the first skirmish with the NATO formation in order to, while gaining time, be ground up in this skirmish of giants. With the entire complexity of this task, it had one characteristic specific feature: the bowstring, once stretched taut, was just not to slacken. Commanders-in-chief came and went—the mission of the troops remained unchanged. Change priorities, turn a vehicle around that was moving along a well-worn path, dismantle a formidable military outpost, and break the age-old stereotypes of consciousness—that burden has been laid precisely on his shoulders.

It is he, Burlakov, who began to realize the idea of a sea bridge from Rostok and Mukran to our native shores when our friends the Poles charged unthinkable prices for the passage of rail cars from their former brothers. He defended and defends, while finding understanding among the Ministry of Defense leadership but while simultaneously amassing hostile elements in the other corridors of power, the need to strictly follow the approved withdrawal schedule and to not transform it into headlong flight with sad social consequences for thousands and thousands of people. That includes those people who are obligated to him because, due to his aggressiveness, today the WGF pays two-thirds of the hard currency cost to put a roof over their heads using outside budget, honestly earned resources.

Now it is easy to find errors, to advise and to point when the first, most difficult part of the journey home has been completed and when the withdrawal process has gained momentum and become sufficiently precise and manageable.

Things are progressing, although far from everything has developed simply and easily. The barracks are beginning to empty—there are no young replacement troops. The unplanned—trained cadres who have adapted to the withdrawal tasks are leaving—has been added to the reduction of officer positions and the planned replacement. The commander-in-chief's heart aches with regard to the real estate being left behind, the issue of selling it is being strongly blocked, and the construction schedule for the promised housing and military garrisons in the new deployment areas is being disrupted.

Besides glib reports, the information that is flowing into WGF headquarters through numerous channels contains quite a bit of bad news of a lesser scale. There was a highway accident there (it's no joke that 6,000 or more vehicles go out on routes everyday in the group), a soldier went AWOL from his unit there, there local "amateur-buyers" attempted for the umpteenth time already to purchase weapons from a daily detail, here the latest polluted sector of soil has been found—another object of very difficult and expensive recultivation...

Until today, the troop withdrawal, the ecology, and the fate of our real estate is the primary, but naturally, not the exhaustive sphere of continuous concern and worry, and there is also combat training which many people by chance forget about for some reason.

"Yes, today our soldiers continue to drive and to fire and the headquarters as before, is involved with what it should be involved," said the commander-in-chief. "Of course, the emphasis has changed. We are not guided by yesterday's thesis: we are looking at both—NATO maneuvers can be transformed into real aggression in no time. The times are different, the situation is different, yes, and our partnership relations are for effect. That is, I want to say that the psychological state of the troops has changed, the watchfulness and suspicion which were stimulated by both sides have disappeared. But the following principle is certainly alive and well: an army is strong through training. There is training and there is discipline. There is discipline—there are no problems with the local population. The attitudes of the Germans toward us is the most important thing for us. Both in the narrow sense because we live as neighbors and in the broader because the Russians and Germans cannot get by without each other in a historical context."

If you listen to other people, there is now wholesale thievery, swindling, and disorder in the WGF. Only hostile forces or lovers of "sensation" and "cooked" facts could provide those assessments. But the Russian Supreme Soviet delegation members who visited the country called it the "elite portion of the native Armed Forces". They noted that it remains a cherished zone where the military mechanism continues to operate smoothly, despite all of the objective difficulties and frequent shortcomings.

This is not a chance phenomenon. Here the material levers operate perfectly, the leadership team has been painstakingly selected and there are many honest, selfless people among the garrison commanders. Although it is understandable, if you take that same German mark, that the mark is training some people well and it is "retraining" some people well. There are quite a few people who have managed to reach the group of forces with one goal in mind—to grab their own. Incidentally, they are getting through even now by taking advantage of the noble goals of the recent Russian Ministry of Defense decision to move people here from "hot spots".

With all of the undoubted pluses—his irrepressible capacity for work and the ability to obtain the maximum return from his subordinates, Burlakov is hardly an angel in the flesh. He is hardboiled, has a commander's directness, and he is simply merciless toward those people who do not justify expectations or who consciously or unconsciously leave the group vulnerable. So it would be naive to think that he is perceived identically by those around him. There are resentful people, there are envious people, and there are dissatisfied people. But, incidentally, they all give him his due—he is not one to bear a grudge, he is honest, and he is consistent. Besides the subjective causes, there are the objective causes that are seriously complicating his life. It is worthwhile recalling that today the WGF is not just a focal point of troops and equipment. It is sort of Russia's temporary hard currency enclave in Europe where economic contacts are being rapidly developed, promising deals are being concluded, and material assets from the unclaimed

reserves of the largest native troop formation are being sold. Well, and this is a sales market and a sphere of fierce competition for foreign firms. Naturally, you will not like everyone here and therefore you will inevitably accumulate enemies, frequently very influential people who are not averse to not nearly gentlemanly methods.

Isn't this a departure point for provoking all sorts of scandals? This quite sly substance that frequently grows from the fact or from that series of passionately arranged small facts that, without having any direct relation whatsoever to either the commander-in-chief's sphere of direct duties, to his capabilities, or to his moral qualities, are nevertheless a "percentage" of his total responsibility.

Maybe Burlakov reacts excessively painfully to evil attacks and gives his unseen enemies further grounds to rub their hands with glee. But character is character, you can't remake it once you've grown up—you will destroy yourself.

"Journalists have some sort of fashionable manner, they hear the tolling of some sort of dirty trick, they don't look into it and they don't verify the reliability of the information—and it ends up in their newspaper columns," said Matvey Prokopyevich. "It's understandable, you don't need a great mind here, a scandalous texture is seductive. I will say in all honesty: various types of people have gathered in the WGF. There are abuses and crimes. And I strongly advocate that not a single scoundrel avoids responsibility in accordance with the law. But I am decisively against false charges and malicious generalizations. They distort the real picture and they prevent us from operating normally."

The commander-in-chief's strained reaction to the insinuations nevertheless does not prevent him from soberly perceiving business advice and even quite sharp objections. His many years service experience have convinced him: a system of balances in the form of alternative opinions must mandatorily operate at the stage of discussing and making a fundamental decision to safeguard a close-knit team and its captain from dangerous turns.

The people who personify the turning points of history are the traditional object of intent public attention to a well-known degree. The current times are especially rich with them and you hear quite a few names of military personnel. In our country, the difficult withdrawal from Afghanistan is legitimately associated with Gromov's personality, the August events—with Grachev, the Black Sea Fleet confrontation—with Kasatonov, the Dniester Republic epic with Lebed. Commander-in-Chief Burlakov is certainly associated with the troop withdrawal from Germany.

The group of forces through which a generation of military people have passed is departing. It is departing with dignity. It is departing with its Battle Flag which, after it has settled down in the museum window alongside the scorched banner of the Great Patriotic War, will preserve the heat of the hands of the 16th commander-in-chief on its staff.

Profile of Taman Division Commander Yevnevich

93UM0107A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Gribov, under the rubric: "Getting To Know The Army and Navy: "The New Division Commander"]

[Text] Writer Yuriy Tarasovich Gribov, whom you know through many articles in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA perceives everything that is associated with the army with a feeling of trepidation. Possibly because he himself is a veteran of the front, he reached the Elbe, he has written several books about wartime and, maybe, therefore the famous essayist has to be interested in the life of the army in such a difficult time and the age-old question for any Russian attracts him, made wiser by his experience and years: "But how is it in the army? How are they serving, our sons and grandsons?"

Yuriy Gribov recently visited the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA temporary duty orders.

A certain "period of social stagnation" sometimes occurs at each military unit when the old commander has already left and the new one has not yet arrived. If that period lasts a long time, various predictions and homespun miscalculations begin to emerge and officers manifest an appreciable impatience: Whom will they assign, what kind of person is he, and where is he from? And even the commanders' wives increasingly gather in groups and whisper outside the doors of the military sales store, and in the evenings they ask their husbands:

"Well, Sasha, what's happening? What's the news? They say they are giving you Sidorov."

"Well, let him lead and rescue us!"

"Well, why? He's respected and he's been through the mill..."

"Your Sidorov is a beast, a martinet! He isn't serving the Homeland but he's serving himself. He's grown a paunch, he is getting old, and he doesn't lead—he yells. Major Zubov served with him. He forced them to make abstracts of the regulations and he doesn't read books..."

"But then again, you have learned Yevgeniy Onegin practically by heart from me and by the way you are pregnant for the second time..."

The change of command at the famous Taman Division occurred in the traditional and solemn manner and there practically wasn't any "period of social stagnation". The order was read before the division formation and the old commander began to turn matters over to the new commander. The old commander was Major-General Valeriy Ivanovich Marchenkov and the new commander is Colonel Yevnevich, also Valeriy, but Gennadyevich. Solemnity was also imparted because Marchenkov and Yevnevich are respected and esteemed both among soldiers and also at the highest headquarters, both of them have been promoted. The post of army chief of staff awaited Marchenkov and the 40-year-old Yevnevich took the controls of a celebrated division and one that is located near Moscow in the middle of the splendid Russian countryside.

Yevnevich was already a guardsman when he arrived at the Taman Guards Division. He commanded the 56th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade. And not just anywhere but in Afghanistan. He received a combat decoration from the hands of General Gromov himself. At that time, he still had not healed properly from the two contusions that he received when some mines exploded. He received the rank of colonel ahead of time, between engagements. "That

Yevnevich is a reckless lad," the journalists spoke of him with respect. And they were not mistaken. Yevnevich is an innate assault soldier, just think, he has 300 parachute jumps under his belt. Everything has somehow been successfully and usefully combined in him: good physical training, military academic education, a commander's talent and something else that is attractive that proceeds from duty and an officer's honesty. He is one of those commanders whom they not only respect but also love. They love him honestly and for a long time, forever...

The colonel led his brigade out of Afghanistan to Turkmeniyya. He began to develop the infrastructure at the new duty location and to get down to business but he soon received an invitation to the General Staff Academy. They don't send everyone there.

Yevnevich graduated from the Academy with honors. He also has a diploma with honors from the Academy imeni Frunze which he received still prior to Afghanistan. He has developed a rule within himself: strive for the highest mark in any endeavor.

Yevnevich quite rapidly became involved with the primary, urgent matters of the Taman Division. He arrived in the middle of the summer and had already practically hit his stride by autumn. A very heavy weight of concerns and difficulties was placed upon him from the very first days. He has had to resolve many issues, both purely everyday business and "civilian" issues. I found the division commander in his office doing this non-military work to which he is not accustomed.

"I need a crane, a crane," he yelled into the telephone. "And I need a welding set. No, not tomorrow, today, by 14:00 hours!"

Having caught sight of my surprised smile, Yevnevich threw up his hands with embarrassment:

"What can I do? You can't get hold of anything and the cold is already pressing in on us. My rear services personnel are asking me to press on using my prestige as a division commander. What times we have lived to see! The general economic chaos is also hurting us in the military..."

I am living in the first regiment's dormitory. The stamping of feet and slamming of doors wakes me up at 6 a.m. These are the officers hurrying to the barracks, to reveille. Something burnt begins to smell in the corridor.

"The bachelors are practicing their culinary skills," explains the duty officer. "The mess hall is expensive..."

The dormitory is jammed primarily with families and with children. There aren't enough apartments. But I also hear consoling conversations. The division command authorities have obtained a large wedge of land from the local sovkhoz, we will build cottages with plots of land and garages. They are beginning to sell potatoes at cheap prices. They have sent trucks to Lipetskiy Oblast for apples. And they will stock up on apples for both the soldiers and for the everyday families. No, the commander is not involved with everyday activities to no purpose. The unheated, underfed, and angry officer, who is especially young, will not be able to entirely devote himself to combat training. He has to use his head and not follow the regulations in his daily life...

Soldiers often approach me at various garrison locations and ask me for a cigarette. They feel self-conscious around the commanders but I am in civilian clothes. I became acquainted with one of the guardsmen. His name is Aleksey and he is from Voronezh.

"Who are you? Maybe you are beginning to gather small plane trees?"

"Are these cigarette butts? We are already fighting over them. A pack of cigarettes is 35 rubles and we receive a total of R180 salary per month. It's awkward for me to always ask Mama..."

"And do you have 'dedy' [senior conscripts who haze new recruits]? Well, they are writing about 'dedovshchina' [hazing of conscripts] everywhere..."

"I myself am a "ded". I'll be going home soon."

"Well, and you have fought over this? Or maybe they offended you?"

"Me? Let someone try... Of course, there have been instances and there will be. Thieves and various types of rogues also come to serve in the army. They need to subdue them when they are civilians. We have a first-class division, you can't misbehave here..."

There is a tall pole on the parade ground, near the grandstand, and there is a Russian flag on it. It is inscribed on the plywood plaque that the flag was raised in honor of 7th company where Guards Senior Lieutenant Bychkov is the commander. And there is a photograph below that and the entire company is in the picture, a total of about 20 people but then again they are all dashing, smiling, well, truly eagles. In September, 7th company took first place and distinguished itself during training while negotiating a water barrier.

Captain Fedoseyev, who happened to be alongside, and I are going to 7th company in 3rd battalion. Major Polin is the commander there. And Fedoseyev is his assistant for educational work. Five minutes had not passed before both Bychkov, 8th Company Commander Stremoukhov, Lieutenants Matyushin, Borodey, Pedchenko, Ebel, and Senior Lieutenants Snezhkovskiy, Bekesh, and Solovyev had appeared.

Captain Fedoseyev began to show them some photographs of the training exercise that had just been developed and animation, recognition of friends, and egging on immediately began...

I caught sight of the division commander in many pictures. And I heard comments about him: he knows how to do everything and he understands with one glance. I myself also became convinced of that at the firing range. Guards Colonel Yevnevich professionally carried out a fire preparation training exercise, including firing from a tank...

I see the division commander in snatches. But he seems to be present even in places where he is absent. That is reflected in order and discipline, and in the division's entire life. And that's how it should be. And we talked in his office only in the evenings, when the brass band was playing on the parade ground and the retreat subunits were returning to the barracks. I already know that Valeriy Gennadyevich has, consciously and with conviction, tied his life to the army.

He was born in Batumi and lived and went to school near Feodosiya, in the small cozy city of Staryy Krym.

And Valeriy wasn't six years old when his father died. His stepfather raised him, a very honest man, a military man, a warrant officer. Valeriy entered Suvorov School but could not pass the physical: his eyes had been damaged at one time. Some boys hit him with a snow ball. He was reckless when he was small and he didn't give anyone any quarter. Later they accepted him at Ryazan Airborne School. His mother, Anna Yegorovna, is from near Ryazan, from the village of Tyrnovo and he went there. And after school and he also followed the airborne assault soldier's path: he served in Lithuania, in Odessa Military District, he went to school, he fought, and then went to school again. He has two sons who are schoolboys. Just think, Denis and Dimka grew up on wheels. His wife Olga Viktorovna has become accustomed to the nomadic officer's life: they are just like everyone else...

I listened to Yevnevich, I looked at him with respect and I, a veteran of the front, wanted to call him by his first name and make myself at home with him but I could not: subordination lives in my soul. Yes, and my ears are accustomed to the military terminology and forms of address. I noticed that Yevnevich himself does not permit undue familiarity while on duty even with his deputies.

Today is Saturday and somewhere it is a day off and people are having a good time but here, at the garrison, they are always working and on duty.

The parents who had arrived to visit their sons had gathered near the meeting room's doors. A strict warrant officer was telling them that they had visited too early and that in general, he said, some of the mothers were spoiling their children.

"And you, sweetheart, don't be angry," a grandmother in a shawl tried to reason with him. "Have an apple, the apples are delicious right now in our area. We have come to see Dima Shapovalov. He is my grandson. And this is my daughter, Nadya, Dimula's mother. We have brought him some sweets..."

"So, you're already coming for the third time? Shapovalov has only served a total of six months. Isn't he from Tula Oblast?"

"You have good eyes," the grandmother smiled, "You've recognized me..."

The warrant officer's comments are largely justified. Some parents not only spoil their children but also take them home, thus facilitating desertion...

"What will the new replacement troops be like?," sighs Yevnevich, when I told him about the meetings at the checkpoint. Conscription into the army has become a problem..."

The division commander also continued the topic of the new replacement troops in the barracks, near the orderly's night table, where the senior NCO's and their artists were attempting to make everything garish and colorful—in the contemporary style.

"That's a good idea," said the division commander. "But for the time being that is your company's individual initiative. Don't hurry. It's important that a young soldier is imbued with the noble and heroic spirit of the Russian Army. From ancient times, from Aleksandr Nevskiy, Dmitriy Donskoy, Suvorov and Kutuzov down to the last war, down to Marshal Zhukov. Our army has always been loved by the people and it must remain such..."

We drove around to various locations during the entire day on Saturday. Yevnevich operated according to his own strict plan and did nothing to no purpose.

"Yesterday, the division commander and I only returned at 1 a.m.," Timur, the division commander's driver, told me when Yevnevich got out of the car to talk with the artillery men. And tomorrow the general is arriving from military district headquarters. We're facing another round..."

The division commander suddenly began to get ready to go to 1st regiment during the evening after some sort of phone call from headquarters. He took me with him. He was concerned about something. He urgently summoned Regimental Commander Denisov from his home. A UAZ truck's brakes squealed about ten minutes later and Guards Colonel Denisov, of a grenadier's height, very decisive, struck his boots on the asphalt and reported in. Yevnevich greeted him and they went off to one side. It was obvious that this was some sort of urgent business.

I looked at the two colonels, at Yevnevich and Denisov, and it was as if I was seeing many other officers whom I had the opportunity to meet here. My heart rejoices: our new Russian Army will be strongly supported by such officers. Yes and I believe the entire country.

Media Allegations of Corruption in Military Examined

93UM0147A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Nov 92 pp 1,2

[Interview with Col Ivan Shapran, chief of the Finance Inspectorate and deputy chief of the Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, by Capt 2nd Rank Yuriy Gladkevich, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Monitoring System in the Army Is Functioning, but There Are Difficulties"]

[Text] The Finance Inspectorate of the Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense believes that the monitoring system in the army is functioning, but there are difficulties"

There has clearly been less rampant criticism of the armed forces of late. This is in all likelihood because Russia is finally beginning to understand that the military is one of the most important state institutions and that any sort of indiscriminate criticism has nothing to do with reforming and strengthening that institution. What we continue to have an abundance of, however, are statements in various mass media alleging that theft and pilferage of property and other items of value are thriving in the armed forces. They make it appear that just about the entire command corps has been caught up in this. Furthermore, the critics would make it appear that those in charge in the Ministry of Defense and personnel of the military department's monitoring agencies are not in

control of the situation and that they frequently actually cover up for the thieves and embezzlers in shoulder boards.

Capt 1st Rank Yuri Gladkevich, our correspondent, asked Col Ivan Shapran, chief of the Finance Inspectorate and deputy chief of the Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, to describe the real situation with respect to the safeguarding of property in the army and navy.

[Shapran] I absolutely reject unfounded assertions that the military department's leadership is not in control of the situation and particularly those indicating that it is covering up for thieves and embezzlers. Nor can I agree with statements made, as an example, by former advisers to Russia's minister of defense in a recent (1 November) broadcast of the Atabaty television program. They are of the opinion that thieves and robbers, or something of the sort, have ganged up in the Western Group of Forces and that the main command element is not only covering up for them but is itself actually involved in the improper affairs. Those claiming this believe that the situation can be rectified only by convincing the minister of defense to accompany them to the ZGV [Western Group of Forces], where they will open his eyes.... This is nonsense. And there is more than enough such nonsense, lies and stretching of the truth in many magazine articles. This is despite the fact that all of the reliable information guiding the correspondents of various publications was revealed in audits and inspections conducted by the military department itself or by agencies of the prosecutor's office responsible for overseeing law-enforcement in the armed forces. And so, we are aware of the situation and are taking the steps necessary.

And there are indeed things to correct. Both common theft and abuses involving prominent military leaders, as well as cases of well-conceived machinations, have been revealed in the military. There is inadequate safeguarding of property and money in many of the large formations. The incidence of losses, shortages and theft of military property, equipment and weapons is showing a growth in 1992.

This growth, in absolute figures, is due to some degree—but certainly not entirely—to the increase in prices in the country. It is also even a result of ineptitude on the part of those in charge and of violations of the procedure for recording and monitoring the safekeeping of items of value. I believe that the objective lack of preparedness of the armed forces to function in a market situation and the rapid flourishing of entrepreneurship have played an extremely negative role. In addition to all else, entrepreneurship, which shows no respect for the law, has also drawn military personnel into the orbit of the criminals.

[Gladkevich] Are you referring to that surge of commercial activity which has surfaced in the armed forces themselves?

[Shapran] Precisely. A lack of control on the part of military commanders and chiefs exposed a host of opportunities for abuses and blatant profiteering at military and state expense. How is one to view the fact that the Navy is selling a floating barracks just out of the repair dock at a reduced price (reduced by almost a half-million dollars)? Many cases involve a basic lack of business acumen, of course, but I believe that this incompetence has frequently been deliberate, since it has rewarded those involved with a tidy sum.

For example, we have every reason to assume a "financial interest" in the actions of a number of military officials who have set their sights on contracts for the sale of fuel in the Baltic Fleet, in Poland and Germany. More than 10,000 tons of diesel fuel has been sold at 2 to 9 rubles per ton in the Baltic Fleet in 1992, for example, while a ton of this fuel was bringing 2,000 to 9,000 rubles in the Baltic countries. Total losses were in the millions of rubles. In Poland the LatVestIst firm also sold a large quantity of diesel fuel at a considerably reduced price, which resulted in a considerable loss to the armed forces. And these losses were in currency, at that. Who is to say that a large sum did not find its way into the pockets of firms "promoting" the deals? I believe that the investigation already underway in many of the cases will provide the answer.

The administration of the Central Directorate for Missile and Other Fuel is obviously to blame. Instead of concluding agreements between the leadership of the groups of forces, districts and fleets and the firms acting as middlemen on joint operations to sell GSM [fuels and lubricants], the TsU RTG [Central Directorate for Missile and Other Fuel] illegally issued a monopoly to the LatVestIst and Mosenikoinvest firms on the sale of petroleum products in the possession of the Western, Northern and Northwestern groups of forces and the Baltic Fleet. These actions by the leadership of the TsU RTG practically removed the finance services of the ZGV [Western Group of Forces], SGV [Northern Group of Forces] and other large formations from the selling process and consequently from the monitoring of and responsibility for it. This has resulted in considerable losses for the armed forces and the state.

[Gladkevich] Ivan Dmitriyevich, the situation was absolutely clear, after all. The property of troops being withdrawn to our country represents a very juicy tidbit for all kinds of sharp operators. Do we not need to step up our monitoring of its sale and beef up the finance and other monitoring agencies?

[Shapran] I agree with you. That is all theoretical, though. In reality, our inspectorate has not only not been reinforced but, on the contrary, has actually been weakened. We are experiencing a significant shortage of personnel. We have only 11 of the 23 officers we are supposed to have. Seven positions are vacant, and five of the seven recently appointed officers have not yet arrived at their new station. The situation is no better in the district and fleet finance services.

Officially the ZGV has people to oversee the sale of property, of course. We actually have three structures engaged in this: a directorate for the sale of the ZGV's property, which is under the group's commander in chief, the main Technical Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Commission on the Use of the ZGV's Property, which is part of the Russian government. Does it make any sense to maintain three structures, which frequently duplicate one another's functions and even interfere with one another? The Ministry of Defense has the Central Directorate of Material Resources and Foreign Economic Relations, after all, a well-structured agency which functions smoothly and has a license to engage in foreign economic activities. It was established not just for the accumulation and planned distribution of material resources, but also for their sale. I suggest that it could very well handle the job in

Germany, freeing us of the difficulties involved in monitoring this work. I also believe that this directorate could defend the interests of the armed forces more persistently.

[Gladkevich] One has the impression that the difficulties you have mentioned have significantly reduced the effectiveness of the monitoring and auditing work in the armed forces.

[Shapran] That is probably so. In general, however, the monitoring system is functioning and retaining its operational capacity. I have already said that we have revealed numerous abuses and violations in the finance and economic work. We have held more than 100,000 servicemen, blue- and white-collar workers accountable for various kinds of infractions in the first 9 months of this year, for example, and the culprits have been fined tens of millions of rubles. More than 70 percent of the losses in the ZGV have been made up.

We also have the daily support of those in charge in the Ministry of Defense. They are irreconcilable when it comes to unscrupulous people and take exceptionally severe action against them. We can absolutely rule out any attempts to "cover up" for anyone. The minister of defense just now signed an order bringing several officials in the TsU RTG to accountability, for example, and two of the guilty parties are to be released into the reserve. And this is not an isolated case.

There are deficiencies in the performance of the monitoring agencies, of course. After they have inspected, the Finance Inspectorate of the GUVBiF [Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance] frequently discovers infractions which the former has not detected. In March, for example, a commission of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces conducted inspections in the ZGV but failed to detect irregularities in the sale of military property, which were subsequently spotted by officers in the Finance Inspectorate of the GUVBiF. We also have cases of deficient audits, which also affects the monitoring effectiveness negatively. This is due both to lack of experience on the part of the inspectors and, unfortunately, to negligence on the part of some workers. And so, a great deal needs to be reinforced in the auditing agencies of the Ministry of Defense themselves.

[Gladkevich] You will agree that it is one thing to deal with crimes severely and something else to prevent crimes.

[Shapran] The time has indeed come to take steps to improve the performance of the finance and other agencies. And we have some proposals for doing so.

They involve more than just visiting the ZGV, as an example, more frequently, even though many people try to present this as just about the most effective method. In any case this is the conclusion drawn when you compare the number of officials travelling to the ZGV to inspect, for example, to the number of inspectors visiting the SZGV or the interior districts. Considerably more go to Germany.

I believe that it is more than just the cause which attracts certain "inspectors." It is more a desire to earn some currency and purchase something in German stores. I have grounds for this conclusion. Take the commission headed by Col B. Polonskiy, chief of the Organization and Planning Directorate and deputy chief of the Main Motor-Vehicle Directorate, for example, which inspected operations of the

ZGV's motor vehicle service from 28 September to 8 October. The inspectors did not look thoroughly into the finance and economic activities and even concluded that all was well in the economic affairs of the motor-vehicle service. An inspection conducted by the Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance immediately afterward proved the conclusions drawn by the GLABTU [Main Motor-Vehicle Directorate] to be unfounded, however. The basic cost of repairs at a bus repair enterprise, for example, exceeds the cost of a new bus. Many machine tools and other pieces of equipment are idle. This idle equipment accounts for almost 95 percent in the casting and forging and the press shops. And the inspectors "did not notice" any of this. As a result, the expenditure of the currency which we need so much has continued. Incidentally, the minister of defense was forced once again to take severe steps in this matter.

To be brief, we will not achieve order with frequent trips by all sorts of inspectors, whether it be personnel from the military department or people's deputies. This should be done by professionals whose duties include monitoring and inspecting the finance and economic activities of the troops, as well as workers from the prosecutor's office. The main thing is not to hamper them.

[Gladkevich] Just how can the performance of monitoring and auditing agencies of the Ministry of Defense be improved?

[Shapran] I believe that three factors are affecting the effectiveness of the monitoring work. The first is the departmental nature of the monitoring and auditing agencies, that is, the subordination of the inspectors to specific commanders and chiefs with the authority to dispense credits based on estimates of the Ministry of Defense. When they audit the finance and economic activities of subordinate services and military units, the auditors are ultimately forced to evaluate the performance (or lack thereof) of immediate superiors upon whom their careers totally depend.

Proposals that the departmental affiliation of monitoring agencies be abolished have been made more than once, but this has not yet been done. It would at least prevent situations such as the ones we have discussed. The situation in which the Main Trade Directorate of the Ministry of Defense is inspected by... none other than the GUT [Main Trade Directorate] of the Ministry of Defense, as an example. It was obviously no accident that this was what received the attention of a commission of the Monitoring Directorate of the Russian president's administration, which conducted an inspection of the ZGV's trade directorate in October. It uncovered numerous cases of negligence, embezzlement and other gross violations in finance and economic operations committed at the personal instructions of former officials of the Main Trade Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. A commission of the Main Trade Directorate of the Ministry of Defense was unable to see the full scope of these infractions when it audited documents on finance and economic activities of the ZGV's trade directorate in March of this year, however.

The second factor is the following. Legal, financial and contractual discipline has deteriorated drastically in the nation in recent years. The number of cases of pilferage and shortages has increased. The auditing staff was drastically

reduced during that period, including that of finance agencies of the main (central) directorates of the armed forces. It also coincided with the authorization of the Ministry of Defense to engage in entrepreneurial (commercial) activities. This has created new opportunities for swindlers and sharp operators.

The third thing is the fact that we also cannot discount the motivation of the inspectors to do a good job. In my opinion, we must work out and introduce a system of material incentives for the auditors. It should include at least a percentage of the state losses disclosed and recovered.

I suggest that by eliminating the influence of these factors, we could anticipate a greater return from the work of the monitoring and auditing agencies. This is extremely important to us, because, in addition to all else, the reform of the armed forces involves not only ridding ourselves of unscrupulous people, but also creating a situation in which all sorts of machinations are simply impossible.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Tactical-Technical Specifications of BMD-3

93UM0078B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major Aleksandr Yegorov: "The BMD-3 Is Able To Do Everything"]

[Text] It is useless to look for information on a vehicle similar to the BMD-3 in foreign information handbooks. According to experts, nothing similar is foreseen in the NATO countries for a minimum of the next 10 years.

The vehicle was developed at General Designer Arkadiy Shabalin's KB [Design Bureau] and has been entering the army and navy inventory since 1990. The BMD-3 is a concentration of innovations and ideas, a certain surplus of which was accumulated during the designers' work on the preceding BMD-1 and BMD-2 vehicles that, as we know, are primarily distinguished from each other by their weapons systems (the "Grom" 2A28 73-mm gun on the BMD-1 and the 2A42 30-mm automatic cannon on the BMD-2).

The BMD-3 is a qualitatively different combat vehicle because it can be air assault landed using both the airlanding and parachute methods with a complete combat crew located inside it. This is a unique quality that exceeds BMD crew combat readiness many times over (henceforth, you won't have to look for your vehicle in the landing zone after you have landed) that has been achieved thanks to the high reliability of the hydropneumatic suspension (the clearance changing mechanism operates on a special liquid and gas) and thanks to the new PBS 950 assault landing system that has been developed by General Designer Nikolay Shirokov's KB.

The BMD-3 is a highly maneuverable vehicle that is distinguished by its mobility on dry land and afloat (including under ocean conditions) which is achieved through the realization of high engine power rating (36 horsepower per tonne), the use of a reversing hydromechanical transmission (five forward and five reverse gears) and a hydraulic positive-displacement [gidroobemnyy] turning mechanism.

To this day, there is perhaps no combat vehicle of this class that can move through water better than the BMD-3. Neither a storm rated at five balls (it actually will not permit it to conduct firing) nor a sizable shell hole in the hull will stop it—the BMD has a very high reserve of buoyancy (the amount of water that the vehicle can accept without sinking is more than 30 percent of its own displacement) and powerful water jets equipped with an automatic water pumping system that has no equivalents.

The BMD-3's Tactical-Technical Specifications

Combat weight, in tonnes	13.2+3.2%
Combat crew, in men	7 (a crew of 2 and 5 assault troops)
Weaponry	2A42 30-mm automatic cannon; a PKT [Kalashnikov Tank Machinegun] 7.62 machinegun twinned with it; an RPKS [Kalashnikov Light Machinegun] 5.45-mm directional machinegun; an AG-17 30-mm directional grenade launcher
Combat load, each	
30-mm projectiles	500 (+360)
9M113 PTUR [anti-tank guided missiles]	4
30 mm projectiles	
BOG-17m	290 (+261)
7.62 mm cartridges	2,000
Armor	Designed to resist small-arms fire
Engine	Multi-fuel 2V-06 diesel
Horsepower	450
Maximum speed, in kilometers per hour:	
—on a paved road	70
—on water	10
Range on a paved road, in kilometers	500
Clearance, in millimeters	
—Operating	500
—Maximum	530
—Minimum	130
Number of vehicles that can be air assault dropped from an IL-76M aircraft, each	3

The BMD's weaponry is listed in the Tactical-Technical Specifications Table. The attentive reader will assess it for himself based on its characteristics. I would only like to direct attention to the AG-17 directional automatic grenade launcher that is installed on the left autonomous mount (on the BMD-2—there is a second machinegun). Thanks to that new innovation, targets that are invulnerable to automatic cannon (its projectile has a low-angle flight trajectory) become vulnerable to the AG-17. As we know, a grenade can travel along a high-angle trajectory.

In a word, the BMD-3—is precisely what is needed for the rapidly developing mobile troops.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Specifications of IL-76MD Transport

93UM0090A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Valentin Rudenko: "The IL-76MD: Wings for an Airmobile Force"]

[Text] In the middle 1960's, it was proposed to two major aircraft firms—ANTK imeni O.K. Antonov and the "Ilyushin" Aircraft Association—that they design the first domestically-produced jet-powered military transport aircraft. The Ilyushin designers won the competition. For many people this was unexpected because that firm had never before been involved with the development of an aircraft of that class.

The IL-76MD's Technical Flight Specifications

D-30KP Engine	4 X 12,000 kilograms of force
Take-off weight	190 tonnes
Maximum commercial payload	50 tonnes
Practical flight range (with maximum payload)	4,200 km
Flight cruising speed	750-780 kilometers per hour
Take-off roll	1,700 meters
Landing run	900 meters
Cargo cabin dimensions	3.45 X 3.4 X 24.5 meters
Crew	7 people

But IL-76 Chief Designer Radiy Petrovich Papkovskiy thinks that it is that fact, more precisely, the fact that the aircraft's developers were not restricted by stereotypes, that largely permitted them to develop this unique aircraft.

The IL-76 has quite a few virtues. This is a short take-off and landing aircraft. It does not require a first class airfield, it can take-off and land on both concrete, dirt and ice fields which it has demonstrated more than once in the Arctic. The IL-76 has a significantly greater cargo compartment than similar Western and domestically-produced military transport aircraft and is capable of transporting all types of an airborne assault division's combat vehicles and more than 90 percent of a motor-rifle division's combat vehicles. On this aircraft, air assaults are conducted simultaneously from four points and can be conducted at altitudes from 3-5 meters up to 4,000 meters for equipment and up to 8,000 meters for personnel, if necessary.

The IL-76 aircraft is capable of self-sufficient operation. It is capable of carrying out tasks far from its home airfield and can be serviced through the crew's efforts alone over the course of two months.

The first experimental aircraft was developed in 1971. The firm's Chief Pilot, Honored Test-Pilot Eduard Kuznetsov, flew it into the air. In June 1974, the IL-76 began to come into the inventory. Our aircraft exceeded the latest, at that time, American C-141 in practically all parameters. It still has no competitors today. The C-17 military transport aircraft that is being developed in the United States today, which they call the aircraft of the future, largely copies the IL in many of its specifications.

Many unusual design solutions have been realized in the IL-76. For example, the landing gear is not located close together but spread apart which increases take-off and landing characteristics when utilizing a dirt airfield. The wheel well is closed during take-off and landing and dirt will not end up in it as occurs on other aircraft. Unique triple-slotted flaps were used on the IL-76, it is equipped with special systems for landing people and equipment and to drop cargoes. The aircraft's primary systems are redundant many times over.

The IL-76 participated in the Afghan War where it was subjected to antiaircraft gun and missile fire many times but only once, at the very beginning of the events (1979), was one shot down. We know of a case when a missile hit the aircraft at an altitude of 7,500 meters and knocked a 2.3 X 2 meter piece from the fuselage. But the aircraft covered another more than 200 kilometers and made a successful landing with that damage.

Despite the fact that the IL-76 is a transport aircraft by design, it has guided weapons and active and passive jamming systems. Two 23-mm aircraft cannons have been installed in the tail section to repel attacks from the rear hemisphere.

The aircraft is equipped with four D-30K engines with 12,000 kilograms of force each that were developed by the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni P.A. Solov'yev.

Continuous modernization and improvement of the aircraft have continued without stopping series production. As a result, they have managed to increase the passenger capacity, cargo capacity and flight range of the IL-76MD that is being produced right now by a factor of more than 1.5 in contrast to the initial version of the IL-76.

A number of special aircraft have been developed based on the military transport aircraft. Among them are the IL-76MDK cosmonaut trainer aircraft, designed for training under weightless conditions, and the "Skalpel" hospital-aircraft, the fuselage of which contains three container-type medical modules—operating, pre-op, and an intensive care chamber and working conditions have been created for a team of 12 doctors. The IL-76TP fire fighting version of the aircraft was developed to extinguish and localize forest fires, to drop equipment and to paratroop firefighters. It carries up to 44 tonnes of fire extinguishing liquids on board. The IL-76MDPS aircraft search-and-rescue system has been successfully utilized to rescue the crews of aircraft and ships that are experiencing disasters on the high seas.

There is also an entire bouquet of modifications of a purely military designation, among which are the IL-78 refueling aircraft and the A-50 airborne radar warning and control aircraft.

The IL-76 has been utilized by civil aviation for many years. It has been adapted to transport the most varied cargoes in containers and on pallets. World records for flight altitude and speed with a commercial cargo and for parachute jump altitude have been set in this aircraft.

The IL-76MD and the IL-76TD aircraft are being exported abroad and have proven themselves in various climactic zones.

At the present time, the "Ilyushin" Aircraft Association is developing a new modification to the aircraft—the IL-76MF. More powerful engines, new equipment, and a lengthened cargo compartment will be installed on the aircraft which will allow the increase of the aircraft's flight range and already impressive cargo capacity.

Successful Test Launch of LRCM From TU-160

93UM0078A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Sergey Prokopenko: "A Russian TU-160 on the Combat Line"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported (4 August 1992) that long range aviation pilots have begun the planned mastery of the TU-160 variable geometry wing, multi-mode and multi-mission missile-carrying heavy bomber at a Russian airfield. According to expert assessments, as of today the TU-160 is the most powerful aircraft system in the world.

However, it has turned out that all of the TU-160 aircraft that have entered the Air Force have remained at Priluki as a result of unilateral "privatization" by Ukraine. The aviators have also shared that fate—some have expressed a desire to serve in Ukraine and others have already arrived in Russia. Quite a few difficulties have certainly awaited them at the new location: social and everyday life problems have still not been resolved and the airfield and facilities require substantial redesign and improvement. And still, despite that, the aviators, along with their new brother-officers, have begun to retrain and reequip the unit to the new type of aircraft—the TU-160 that is entering the Russian Air Force inventory.

But yesterday one more event occurred at the unit which in a certain sense one can categorize as historical. A crew consisting of Commander Lieutenant Colonel A. Zhikharev, Lieutenant Colonels A. Gavrilov and A. Pakuylev and Major M. Moiseyenko carried out an actual launch of a long-range aircraft cruise missile for the first time at a state aircraft range. After the release which occurred at high altitude, the missile, which executed the flight based on an assigned program, destroyed a training target. An IL-76 crew commanded by Test Pilot G. Stadnik provided the monitoring-measurement escort.

The selfless work of ground-based aircraft specialists Officers A. Smyzhin, G. Farkhutdinov, N. Imnitskiy, S. Shevlyakov, V. Borshchev and many others largely facilitated the successful conduct of the launch.

We remember that there were quite a few skeptics who thought that Russia would lose the TU-160 aircraft, if not forever then at least for a long time, if they remained in Ukraine. The current launches have proven that the Russian Air Force not only has the most powerful aircraft systems in the world but that the crews are also capable of successfully employing them.

Technical Profile of SU-25 TK

93UM0146A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Vitaliy Moroz: "The SU-25 TK: They Are More Precisely Defining the Ground Attack Aircraft's Missions"]

[Text] When the SU-25 took off for the first time in February 1976, the Americans already had ground attack aircraft and the experience of their employment in local conflicts. Shaken by the course and the outcome of the war in Vietnam, they displayed a great deal of inventiveness during the development of the A-10A ground attack aircraft which was accepted into the U.S. Army [sic] inventory in 1974. They normally compare the combat potential of other aircraft that are designed for close air support of ground troops and for operations at low and extremely low altitudes over the field of battle with the Thunderbolt, as they call the A-10A.

The SU-25 appears to hold its own in that comparison. As it was conceived, the aircraft is simple in layout and equipment and is accessible for a pilot with average skills. The excellent armor protection, much greater maneuverability than that of high-speed fighter-bombers, and powerful weaponry permit the SU-25 to carry out the most varied missions in support of ground subunits and to feel confident of itself in PVO [air defense] zones that are based on anti-aircraft small-arms weapons. The ground attack aircraft was harshly tested by Afghanistan where it proved to be a survivable and effective aircraft.

And yet the time of ground attack aircraft, the concept of which had already been defined in the 1970's, is fading into history. The nature of troop air defense is rapidly changing. It is becoming saturated with surface-to-air missile systems, including portable and mobile systems. It is impossible to protect yourself from missiles with armor alone. The ground attack aircraft is in dire need of electronic countermeasures systems and antiradiation weapons. We must also consider that the ratio of third generation tanks (and the fourth generation is approaching) in ground troops combat formations is increasing. You can only destroy the latest tanks with precision-guided missiles with powerful warheads. Judging by everything, this class of missiles is destined to become the main weapon of ground attack aviation in the foreseeable future.

In this context, the SU-25 TK with which we are familiarizing our readers is blazing the trail to the future. Its fundamental innovation is in its specialization. It is the best of all the currently existing combat aircraft that was manufactured to combat Abrams M1A2 tanks that are protected with very powerful multi-layer or active armor.

SU-25TK Technical Flight Specifications

Maximum Take-off Weight, in kilograms	19,500
Fuel Capacity in Internal Tanks, in kg	3,840
Maximum Combat Payload, in kg	4,360
Maximum Flight Speed, in kilometers	950
Maximum Operational G-Load	+6.5
Number of Weapons Hard Points	10
Operational Radius With a Two-Tonne Combat Payload, in km	
—Near the Ground	400
—Along a High-Altitude Profile	700
Ferry Range With External Fuel Tanks, in km	2,500
Length of Take-off and Landing Run Along a Dirt Air Strip, in meters	600-700

If they figuratively call the A-10A the "aircraft built around a cannon", since its strength is precisely in the 30 mm seven barreled cannon with the large combat load (1,350 projectiles), you can equate the SU-25T with an antitank missile battery that is flying over the field of battle. It is equipped with the unique "Vikhr" [Whirlwind] antitank weapons system that consists of 16 supersonic guided missiles. The tandem shaped-charge warhead of these missiles pierces the armor of modern tanks practically in any projection. But thanks to the improvement of the sighting instruments and the repeated magnification of the target depiction on the screen, the pilot has acquired the capability to aim the missile at the tank's most vulnerable location. Moreover, the ground attack aircraft can also use its antitank weapons to destroy enemy helicopters and transport aircraft. During testing, the SU-25TK shot down a TU-16 target aircraft with a "Vikhr" missile.

On the whole, the weaponry of the SU-25T, that took off into the air for the first time in August 1984, is varied. It includes antiradiation guided missiles, guided missiles with laser guidance systems, 80-370 mm unguided rockets, aircraft conventional and "smart" bombs, and air-to-air missiles with infrared homing guidance. The ground attack aircraft also kept its 30 mm double-barreled cannon. That weapon permits the SU-25T to successfully carry out other missions along with the destruction of armored vehicles: destroy enemy bridges and field fortifications, and disable PVO systems, combat ships and amphibious assault craft. The specific features of flight and sighting equipment provide the ground attack aircraft with obvious advantages over fighter aircraft in combat with helicopters.

The SU-25TK's combat effectiveness is determined not only by the quality and variety of weaponry but also by the innovative, high specifications of the sighting system. The "Shkval" [Squall] electro-optical system with television channels which is mounted in the aircraft nose section has permitted the increase of the accuracy of destruction of ground targets, even with ordinary aircraft bombs, by nearly a factor of three. At night, they hand the pilot another television system—"Merkuriy" [Mercury]. According to expert assessments, the SU-25TK's sighting system outstrips corresponding developments abroad by 5-6 years.

The electronic warfare system that is located on board the aircraft has incorporated the latest achievements of science into combat practice.

You already can't call the ground attack aircraft a simple and cheap aircraft in its new look. Operations over the field of battle are becoming increasingly problematical for inexpensive, modestly equipped aircraft. Visual navigation and reconnaissance are a thing of the past. In contrast to its predecessors, the SU-25TK has been equipped with everything necessary for flights in the automatic mode. Automation guides the aircraft to the target area with a high degree of accuracy. The television system that has been oriented in the required direction beforehand, makes it easy for the pilot to control target selection and lock-on. After he presses the combat button, the system independently selects the required munition and carries out its launch. A repeat sortie to the target, if there is need to do that, is also possible in the automatic mode, just like the return to the airfield: the pilot can assume control of the aircraft just prior to landing.

Externally, the ground attack aircraft has changed little, it has remained just like we have been accustomed to seeing it over these long years. Indeed, its contours and cockpit silhouette remind us more of the two-seat combat-training version of the SU-25. Practically everything that distinguishes the new aircraft from its previous version has been installed inside the aircraft, behind the armored covering and under its wing—on the hard points for hanging weaponry.

Since 1976, the SU-25 ground attack aircraft has been produced at the Tbilisi Aircraft Plant. The aircraft plant at Ulan-Ude is ready to set up series production of the SU-25TK if that decision is made. The engines for this aircraft (R-195) with increased thrust and significantly lower infrared emissions are being manufactured at Ufa. The "Shkval" sighting system was developed at "Zenit" Krasnogorsk OMZ.

The SU-25TK, which has no equals right now, is the result of the logical development of the SU-25 mass production combat aircraft. And at the same time, it is being perceived as the prototype of a new generation ground attack aircraft.

4th Air Army Completes Withdrawal from Poland

93UM0158B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Nov 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Withdrawal of Air Army from Poland Is Completed"]

[Text] The withdrawal of the 4th Air Army from the territory of Poland will be completed on 14 November. The unit colors of the large strategic formation that became famous during the Great Patriotic War were transferred in ceremonies to the personnel of the army—the successors of its combat traditions. It is noteworthy that during the war it was this army that covered itself with glory in the battle for the Northern Caucasus. On behalf of the leadership of the Air Force, Colonel-General of Aviation Yevgeniy Zarudnev, deputy commander in chief of the Air Force for combat training, presented the colors to their new owners.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Yeltsin Discusses Caspian, Naval Mission

93UM0137B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Maryukha: "Boris Yeltsin: The Navy's Chief Mission—To Keep Russia's Sea Border Strong"]

[Text] This pertains to the Caspian Flotilla as well, the Russian president emphasized during a visit to units of the 270-year-old major formation on the Caspian, which has moved its station from Baku to Astrakhan. Russia is establishing reasonably good relations with sovereign states reaching to the shore of the former Union's inland sea, declared Boris Nikolayevich, but their borders with other states are still "transparent." This is why Russia will have to

ensure dependable border protection along its frontier with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

In an interview with journalists Boris Yeltsin noted that in the immediate future Russia intends to sign first a bilateral agreement with Kazakhstan on cooperation in the Caspian Sea basin, and then an agreement with the rest of the states in the region, which may include Iran as well. A directive on measures to protect sturgeon and to protect the population and reduce the damage to the national economy resulting from higher water levels in the Caspian Sea, and the edict "On State Support to Revival of the Russian Merchant Marine on the Caspian Sea" are a prologue to preparing these agreements.

As far as the Caspian Flotilla is concerned (its Russian part is comprised of around 30 ships, most of which have already transferred to the new base in Astrakhan), Boris Yeltsin referred to the decision to withdraw it from Baku as "very proper both from the political and from the military point of view." Some problems of redeployment have yet to be discussed with the leadership of Azerbaijan, but it is already clear today that the flotilla basically still exists. Fifteen warships were transferred to Azerbaijan, and a considerable amount of real estate was left behind in Baku. However, the president reported that the flotilla will be complemented by modern ships, and the housing and other social problems of the naval seamen will be solved.

This approach to solving the long overdue military and political problems of the Caspian Sea, interrelationships on the shores of which used to be regulated by very old agreements between Russia and Persia (Iran), will make it possible for the Caspian Flotilla to become a stabilizing factor in the region, where Russia's interests should be dependably defended, besides through other measures, by naval seamen.

Kasatonov Makes Statement on Black Sea Fleet

93UM0108A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Oct 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "From Sevastopol: Admiral Kasatonov Has Issued a Statement on the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] Admiral Igor Kasatonov has denied rumors of an impending rebasing of the Black Sea Fleet to Novorossiysk. The admiral, who was recently appointed to the post of first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy but who continues to perform the duties of Black Sea Fleet commander, issued the statement on Thursday. As the Black Sea Fleet Press Center reported to an ITAR-TASS correspondent today, it specifically states that, based on a Russian Government decision, only a portion of the naval unit that was previously located at Poti will be transferred to an area of the Black Sea coast in Krasnodar Kray.

Igor Kasatonov especially stressed that he "has never changed and will not change his position on the issue of the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet's primary forces. Sevastopol was, is, and must remain the fleet's main base. It is inadvisable from the military point of view, economically backbreaking, and ecologically disastrous to transfer the fleet to Novorossiysk. I also intend to defend this position in the future," concluded Admiral Kasatonov.

Air Operations on Kuznetsov: Photo Caption

93UM0077A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Oct 92 p 1

[Untitled, unattributed photo caption]

[Text] Having successfully completed a program of test operations in the Black Sea, Navy seamen and aviators have begun training flights in Russia's northern waters.

Aircraft developed at the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni P.O. Sukhoy have completed their first flights over the Barents Sea from the deck of the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov in accordance with a field testing program. Flight Crew Test Pilots 1st Class Sergey Melnikov (an instructor from the firm) and Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Diorditsa (State Flight Test Center imeni V. P. Chkalov) took off in a ground-attack aircraft SU-25 UTG (flight trainer with an arresting hook). Having completed a flight over the waters of the Barents Sea, they, with exquisite accuracy, brought the ground-attack aircraft down onto the cruiser's flight deck and caught the arresting hook on the braking system cable.

A beginning has been made. The Navy seamen and aviators have a common holiday. The humdrum existence is behind them. Today line unit aviators are developing their flying skills from the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov. They are preparing to fly not in vertical takeoff and landing aircraft but in SU-27 and MIG-29 fighter aircraft and SU-25 ground attack aircraft. We wish you successful combat training for the good of the Homeland!

Naval Situation in Caspian Sea

93UM0108B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Vladimir Maryukha: "The Caspian: Five States—Five Navies?"]

[Text] Khvalynskoye is one of the historical Russian names for the Caspian Sea, the largest landlocked body of water in the world. Our interests here have been represented for a very long time. But the situation has changed with the disintegration of the Union. In contrast to ancient times when tribes of Casps, who gave the sea its modern name, dwelled here and peacefully shared the Caspian's wealth with their neighbors, the interrelations of the states that border the Caspian have not at all been regulated. And nearly 80 percent of the world catch of sturgeon is caught here. And there is also oil and gas. It is no coincidence that right now the glances of the countries that need energy resources and that are experiencing serious fuel problems as a result of the Persian Gulf crisis are directed here. So, we need to think so that the Caspian does not become a sea of discord.

Until today, the international legal regime of the internal sea that was defined by ancient treaties between Russia and Persia (Iran) did not leave any hope of penetration for other states in the area of the Caspian Sea that practically marked the border of the Union. With the collapse of the latter, five subjects of international relations—Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran—have suddenly gained access to the sea. The naval relations of these sovereign countries have practically still not been defined in

any way. And we can't talk about the fact that good neighbor relations will be structured on the previous treaty foundations.

The Caspian Flotilla of the former Soviet Navy that did not survive until its 270th Anniversary by a total of several months has already been divided between Russia and Azerbaijan. Now, the Russian portion—the headquarters and naval base—are being relocated from Baku in accordance with the Russian Federation Minister of Defense's order. Of the Russian share of the flotilla, one ship and approximately 20 auxiliary vessels that support the transport of equipment remain in Baku. They still need to equip the bare-bones basing facility at the mouth of the Volga to the level of the naval base because it is clear that it is incapable of supporting the flotilla's vital activities in its present form. The new base supports an average of just under 20 percent of all indicators—from quays to housing for officers and warrant officers—for the already assigned portion of the flotilla.

The process of dividing naval forces on the Caspian has still not been completed. Having announced claims to its share of the flotilla in May, Kazakhstan is not insisting on an immediate transfer of ships. But, judging by the information I have, the battalion of small vessels that is deployed on the territory of Turkmeniya has already caught the fancy of the local authorities.

The absence of international agreements on territorial waters and economic zones in the Caspian Sea, just like the dissatisfaction with the continental division of the former Union, could very well become a new seat of tension. All the more so that the new status of the "open" Caspian also assumes the presence of their own naval forces for all of the sovereign states that have access to the sea.

We couldn't find anyone who wanted to speak on that topic at the Russian Navy Main Staff.

That position is more than strange. Don't we really need to begin a conversation on Russia's state interests when they will already be infringed upon as it has occurred many times before? Already today the question is being raised about safety of navigation for Russians in the Caspian Sea. Nine of the 24 lighthouses, those that are located in Azerbaijan, are no longer under the "jurisdiction" of our flotilla. The remaining lighthouses are also not in the best condition. As Viktor Makurin, the chief of "Kara-Ala" lighthouse that has now turned out to be on the territory of sovereign Turkmeniya, has written to the editorial staff, the lighthouse equipment dating from "the times of Ochakov" is on its last legs.

And flotilla ship repair? The outwardly peaceful division of the flotilla occurred as follows: 30 percent of the ships and 100 percent of the real estate with the Azerbaijani "residence permit" was left in Baku. But then again, the remaining ships that were withdrawn are far from new and already today required replacement with more modern models. But still, the ship repair plant cannot build them immediately.

"The flotilla's primary forces have already been redeployed to the new location," Main Staff First Deputy Chief Vice Admiral Vladimir Lyashenko told me before his last temporary duty assignment to the Caspian. "We will report our

problems to Russian President Boris Yeltsin during his planned trip to this region. And it is a matter for the President and the government to resolve how much of the enormous sums that the flotilla needs to allocate to infrastructure and in what time periods..."

We must not forget about the fifth subject of the relations that was here before and which is actually the reason for the Caspian Flotilla's existence which was to defend against the threat from it (or from infringements against the USSR across its territory). On the Caspian map, Iran is depicted as a narrow strip of coastal waters with a naval base (primarily a training base) at Pekhlevis with its insignificant number of patrol boats. That position has been maintained, I stress, based on sufficiently ancient treaties. Having its own point of view on events in the Caucasus region and economic interests in the Caspian Sea that is being opened under pressure of political circumstances, Iran is quite capable of extending its influence significantly farther than the limits that were assigned to it long ago. A buildup of forces could occur as rapidly as the length of the period of uncertainty in the Caspian Sea's international-legal regime.

The Azerbaijani Navy will turn out to be third after Iran and Russia in strength and combat capability. In conversations with republic Ministry of Defense representatives (primarily representatives of the former Union's Ground Forces), I had the opportunity to listen to the opinion that the Azerbaijani Navy will be insignificant in strength and will not develop or modernize in the near future as a result of the strategic tasks in the ground theaters and economic difficulties. The far from new ships will be serviced by 222 Azerbaijani seamen. Crew strength on the ships did not exceed 5-6 people in the last days before the transfer to Azerbaijan.

Be that as it may, the 270 year old flotilla that has borne far from combat losses for now remains the only real force in the Caspian. Not only the energy and fishing interests of Russia and the Commonwealth countries but also promising directions of the Navy's development are under its protection. The existing scientific facility where wing-in-ground-effect combat vehicles will undergo a "breaking-in period" in the future—this is one of the most promising paths to improve the state's naval might. But besides military, including naval, force, state interests must also be defended by international agreements. But the Caspian has enough problems even without the unclarified relations of the various states. And all the more so since there will be more than enough problems in the future.

Performance, Specifications of KA-29 Helicopter

93UM0108C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Sergey Prokopenko: "KA-29: Attacking From the Sea"]

[Text] According to Helicopter Scientific-Technical Complex imeni N.I. Kamov Deputy Chief Designer Veniamin Kasyannikov, the Americans could have actually seen more of these helicopters and they really are ours. Their basing location is on naval ships. The KA-29 shipborne transport-combat helicopter belongs to that family of aircraft that have been developed under the guidance of Chief Designer Sergey Mikheyev. It was designed to conduct the assault landing of

subunits and their weapons from ships, to provide them with fire support, and to transport personnel and cargo.

The helicopter was manufactured according to the OKB's [experimental design bureau] traditional coaxial design with two gas turbine engines. Engine start up is carried out from an auxiliary power plant that provides independence from airfield power sources. A high power-to-weight ratio permits the helicopter to be used in a broad range of outside air temperatures and under conditions of high humidity. The engine output is sufficient to use this aircraft in prolonged hover modes. The crew has the capability to continue flying while gaining altitude in the event one of the engines fails.

The helicopter is equipped with thermoelectrical anti-icing systems for the rotor blades, air intakes and the crew cockpit windshields to increase flight safety under icy conditions.

The KA-29 helicopter can be used in two versions—transport and combat and reequipping from one version to the other can be carried out under ship conditions.

The transport version supports air transport of 16 assault troops with their weapons and up to 10 wounded personnel, including four on stretchers. Assault-transport and first aid and medical kits have been provided for this purpose. The helicopter can be equipped with a rescue winch with a cargo capacity of up to 300 kilograms.

Surveillance-sighting equipment suites and external belly tank trusses with four weaponry deployment girder racks are installed on the combat version.

If the KA-29 is armed only with a 7.62 mm movable machinegun with a combat load of 1,800 shells in the transport version, it can have, besides that gun, other adequately diverse and powerful weapons in the combat version. These are eight "Shturm" antitank guided missiles; 40-80 or 64-128 (depending on the type) unguided aircraft rockets in canisters; two universal pods with 23 mm cannons and a combat load of 250 projectiles; and, two 3B-500 type napalm tanks.

Primary Data For the KA-29 Helicopter

Normal take-off weight, in kilograms	11,000
Maximum cargo weight:	
—in the cockpit, in kilograms	2,000
—in an external belly tank	4,000
Engines:	
—Type	TVZ-117V
—Rating, horsepower	2 X 2,200
Maximum speed, in kilometers per hour	280
Cruising speed, in kilometers per hour	235
Operational flight ceiling, in meters	4,300
Tactical radius in the combat version (while carrying out 6-8 attacks in a combat operations zone), in kilometers	100
Operational flight range:	
—Maximum, in kilometers	460
—Ferry range, in kilometers	740
Crew	2 people

The helicopter's combat survivability is ensured by armor-plating the crew cockpit and engine components and by protecting fuel tanks and filling them with foam polyurethane.

The helicopter is equipped with flying (PKV-27) and navigation (NKV-27) equipment suites which provide automatic stabilization in all flight regimes, automatic pilot of the helicopter along a previously programmed route with the plotting of pre-landing maneuvers, and also the accurate guidance of the helicopter to the assault force drop zone based on radio-technical system signals.

The experienced accumulated by the OKB during construction of the KA-10, KA-15, KA-25, and KA-27 helicopters was utilized during the development of the KA-29 helicopter and permitted them to successfully resolve problems of helicopter and ship compatibility.

Specifications of Ivan Rogov Class Landing Ship Dock

93UM0137C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Vasilii Fatigarov: "With a Battalion Aboard"]

[Text] In the 1970s the U.S. Navy significantly increased its mobility with large tank landing ships. The potential adversary's possibility for transferring entire marine infantry divisions in just days to any point on the globe necessitated adequate retaliatory measures. And the amphibious warfare ships that were in the Soviet Navy at that time—for example of the Voronezhskiy Komsomolets class built in 1964—were no longer up to this mission.

A fundamentally new amphibious warfare ship was required. And so its design was developed under the guidance of chief designer N. V. Maksimov. It differed from its predecessors chiefly in its significantly greater displacement, and consequently its capability for delivering a larger number of men and equipment to a landing site. Moreover a gas turbine was employed for the first time on the large amphibious warfare ship in place of the traditional diesel propulsion unit, which made it possible to increase speed and maneuverability.

The purpose of the new ship was stated as "loading tracked and wheeled combat and military transport equipment and infantry subunits from an engineered and an unengineered shore, transferring them by sea and landing them on an unengineered coast without the use of assault landing craft and helicopters." The possibility of loading watercraft, including four modifications of landing craft, was also foreseen in this case. The first large amphibious warfare ship, which was christened the Ivan Rogov, became the largest amphibious warfare ship in the world. The U.S. Navy's largest tank landing ship (Newport class) has a lower displacement.

A large amphibious warfare ship of this design is able to deliver a motorized rifle battalion consisting of 440 men and 79 units of equipment or a tank subunit (up to 46 principal tanks and their crews) to a landing site on an unengineered shore. Amphibious equipment is landed in a sea state of up to three points and in the presence of four-point winds, while all other equipment is landed in the presence of a ford not more than 1.2 meters deep.

The landing ship's stability satisfies the stability norms of our country's marine register. It is capable of operating in all marine theaters under all weather conditions. The ship's hull can even run aground on a shallow shore without damage.

These ships were built in Kaliningrad. A total of three ships were given to the navy: the Ivan Rogov in 1978, the Aleksandr Nikolayev in 1982 and the Mitrofan Moskalenko in 1989. The first two are serving in the Pacific, and the third in the North.

Specifications of the Ivan Rogov Class Large Amphibious Warfare Ship

1. Displacement
 - Standard, unloaded8,600 tonnes
 - Normal, unloaded.....9,890 tonnes
 - With a load of 46 tanks.....12,110 tonnes
 - Landing.....13,880 tonnes
2. Dimensions, meters
 - Greatest lengthabout 160
 - Greatest width.....about 25
 - Average draft.....4.2-5.5
3. Tank hold dimensions, meters
 - Height3-4.7
 - Width.....12
 - Length.....54
4. Docking compartment dimensions, meters
 - Height8.2-10.2
 - Width.....12
 - Length.....75
5. Speed
 - Flankabout 21 knots (37.8 km/hr)
 - Full.....about 19 knots (34.2 km/hr)
 - Endurance.....about 18 knots (32.4 km/hr)
 - Economic.....about 14 knots (25.2 km/hr)
6. Endurance with respect to provisions30 days
 - For assault party15 days (500 persons)
 -30 days (250 persons)
7. Main propulsion unit: twin-shaft gas turbine, total output—36,000 horsepower
8. Armament:
 - a) Missiles and artillery
 - 122-mm inclined missile launcher
 - 72.6-mm twin artillery mount
 - two quad 30-mm artillery mounts
 - b) Hydroacoustic:
 - station for communication with submarines
 - two stations for detection of commando gear and equipment

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Interview with Chief of Budget and Finance Directorate

93UM0158A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Nov 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev, chief of the Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense; place and date not given: "Military Service: Incentives, Benefits, Compensation"]

[Text] The letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA this year have a pronounced social orientation. Every other letter received by the editorial staff to some extent touches upon problems of stimulating military labor, performing service in "hot spots," servicemen pensions, housing, and other social problems.

A number of letters contain sharp, impartial criticism of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, which, in the opinion of the authors, is not making proper efforts to solve urgent social problems.

At the request of the editorial staff, the chief of the Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant-General Vasily Vorobyev, comments on the situation at hand.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vasily Vasilyevich, how do you react toward the criticism of activities of the Ministry of Defense in the area of social protection of servicemen and their family members?

[Vorobyev] Fine, if the criticism is constructive and contains sound suggestions for accomplishing certain tasks. One can only welcome such an approach. Unfortunately, many people, expressing generally good wishes regarding fundamental resolution of social problems in the Army and Navy, do not always fully realize the situation our country is now in. Suggestions and plans isolated from the realities of life and not supported by the corresponding appropriations are merely harmful to the cause, since, being made public, they adversely affect the morale in military collectives.

Concerning the activities of Russia's Ministry of Defense and, in particular, the Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate in the area of social protection of servicemen and civilian personnel of the armed forces, believe me, everything possible is being done in the situation that has taken shape to ensure fitting conditions for the life and activities of servicemen.

We are not able to solve all urgent social problems immediately, primarily for economic reasons. But much has been done, especially this year. On the majority of issues, we are finding the proper understanding and support of the President and Government of Russia and the Ministry of Finance. I must say with all responsibility that the leadership of the Ministry of Defense considers material support of personnel of the Army and Navy to be among the most important priorities in organizational development of the Armed Forces of Russia at the present stage.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But in conditions of the "astronomical" price increases, many officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel assess the existing level of their wages as low...

[Vorobyev] Now military wages are often compared to the wages in commercial structures, thriving enterprises and organizations. But I do not think that these can serve as a reference point for us today: the percentage of workers employed in commercial structures is not great. Yes, there are population groups having super-high and high incomes considerably exceeding the pay and allowances of servicemen in most of the foreign countries.

If we are talking specifically about steps being taken to increase the pay of servicemen, this year alone it has already increased fivefold. Readers of the senior generation remember well that in previous years changes in servicemen's pay amounted to raises of 10-20 rubles [R] no more than once in a five-year period, although money then had a tendency to decrease in value.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In their letters, servicemen often touch upon questions of providing incentives for serving in special conditions. Thus, Captain A. Karpov writes that inflation long ago negated the stimulating role of monetary bonuses for parachute jumps and a proficiency rating. Similar letters have been received from the Navy.

[Vorobyev] Indeed, whereas pay for position and pay for rank have increased, the solving of other problems was constantly delayed again due to the difficult economic situation. As a result, many types of incentive pay have lost all meaning. A compulsory-service soldier, for example, in the Airborne Troops had to make seven parachute jumps and practically fulfill the annual norm of jumps in order to buy a pack of cigarettes for the monetary bonus received for this. A diver had to work more than an hour and a half at a depth of 50 meters in order to make the same purchase. Payments of 10-20 rubles for special service conditions on crews of tanks, aircraft, ships, and submarines have become absolutely archaic.

In order to correct the situation, the minister of defense signed an order to increase certain types of additional pay directly affecting the state of combat readiness of the Army and Navy. In particular, effective 1 November of this year, the amount of compensation is increased to R200-R540 for parachute jumps and to R950 for a drop-zone delivery inside military equipment or together with it. The monthly bonus for compulsory-service personnel has been increased to R100-R360 for special service conditions in paratrooper units, tank and combat vehicle crews, and on submarines and ships. The monthly proficiency rating pay has been increased to R100 for those having a 2nd class rating and to R180 for those having a 1st class rating. Servicemen will be paid from R50 to R450 for every hour they work underwater at depths up to 50 meters. An additional pay of 15 to 30 percent of position pay has been established for military medical personnel for working in hazardous conditions. The steps taken have made it possible to increase the overall level of pay and allowances by R600-R1200 for individual categories of officers and warrant officers and by 1.5-2.5 times for soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and petty officers. A significant innovation is that now these types of additional pay I have listed are established in relative amounts—in

percentage of position pay of a platoon commander. If this pay increases in the future, the types of additional pay will also increase automatically in the same proportion.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What measures of social protection are being taken with respect to servicemen serving in "hot spots?"

[Vorobyev] This year a number of decisions have been made on this matter. This had to do with the peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, Moldova, and other regions of the former USSR. For example, for servicemen who are part of the Joint Forces and directly involved in performing combat missions for settling the conflict between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, supplemental pay has been established in the amount of R8000 for a private, R8200 for a squad leader, R9000 for a company commander, and R10,000 for a battalion commander. These servicemen are paid a bonus in the amount of the supplemental pay for impeccable service when they have performed the assigned missions in the area of the emergency situation. Appropriate bonuses are provided for explosive ordnance disposal, payment in higher amounts of insurance, and preferential calculation of years of service for pension.

Today, proposals have been prepared on establishing a single procedure for material support of servicemen performing missions in areas with an unstable socio-political situation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Everyone is aware of the problem of orphanhood in our country. Many orphans eventually join the ranks of the defenders of the fatherland...

[Vorobyev] This year a number of decisions have been made that help to improve their material well-being. The salaries of cadets at military educational institutions who are orphans or have been left without the care of parents are established at a level more than twice the pay of other cadets. Beginning 1 November of this year, if he succeeds in making the grade of excellent, he is paid R1305. Annual benefits in the amount of the salary have been established for students at military educational institutions. Lump-sum payments upon discharge have been established at a higher amount for compulsory-service personnel who are orphans.

I want to emphasize that an order of the minister of defense of the Russian Federation has just been signed that provides payment for travel twice a year at the state's expense for students not having officer rank, cadets, students at a Suvorov or Nakhimov school, and preinduction-age youths enrolled in the Military Music School and military orchestras for travel during winter and summer vacations to their nearest relatives, guardians, or children's homes where they were raised. Those who have reached the age of 16 will be granted free passes to Army and Navy rest homes, resort hotels, and tourist bases. Orphans who are graduates of a Suvorov school, the Nakhimov School, Military Music School, or are enrolled in military orchestras and for various reasons have not enrolled in military educational institutions and are leaving the Army are issued a set of clothing, shoes, bedding, and other accessories, which can be replaced by payment of monetary compensation if they so desire.

We believe that all our preinduction-age youths in training should have "pocket" money in addition to rations in kind. Beginning 1 November of this year, Suvorov, Nakhimov,

and music school students shall be paid R240 and orphans R750 per month. Certainly, the amounts are not great, but they enable the lads to acquire personal hygiene items and sometimes simply have a treat, after all, they are still children.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You know how difficult it is in a small camp, worker settlement, or remote garrison for servicemen to place their children in a nursery or kindergarten. Added to this are the fantastic prices for keeping children in children institutions. We know that the issue has been resolved, but, judging from letters to the editor, not everyone knows about this in the localities.

[Vorobyev] At the suggestion of the Ministry of Defense, on 5 October 1992, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted a decree on compensating servicemen for keeping their children in school and preschool institutions. Now all servicemen, regardless of to whom the nursery or kindergarten belongs, will pay no more than 20 percent of the cost of keeping a child in a children's institution, that is, since this has been provided for by a corresponding decree of the Supreme Soviet of Russia. The rest of the costs of supporting the child will be transferred by the military unit on the basis of a contract to the enterprise or organization in charge of the children's institution.

Incidentally, the issue of using funds of the Ministry of Defense to reimburse expenditures for instruction of the children of Russian servicemen in schools of the Baltic states, republics of the Transcaucasus, and the Republic of Moldova, and also as compensation for the increase in the cost of feeding children in school institutions in the amounts and on terms established in these states.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Officer V. Kravtsov, who is serving in the Baltic region, writes that there is a considerable personnel shortage in their military unit. As a result, the entire burden of guarding weapons, military equipment, and property falls on the shoulders of other servicemen. Are there any provisions for material incentives for performing additional duties?

[Vorobyev] Effective 1 October of this year, payment of monetary compensation has been established for officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel in the amount of a field allowance for each daily duty detail as part of a guard detail, and for night duty guarding installations—at half the established field allowance rate.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is the situation with increasing the field allowance rate?

[Vorobyev] This has also been resolved. In accordance with Order No 210 of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation of 4 November 1992, a field allowance in the amount of R80 has been established for the time of performing tasks at training centers and in other instances. The payments I have cited will be made in the new amounts beginning 1 July of this year.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Captain S. Remizov from Kaunas writes that he received a serious injury while on duty. However, since May of this year he has not received the insurance amount he should. Where should he turn to get it? Officers V. Yevseyev and L. Chistov, who serve outside the Russian Federation, had similar questions.

[Vorobyev] Payment of insurance amounts specified by existing legislation of the Russian Federation is accomplished through agencies of the Russian State Insurance Company. In accordance with the Tashkent Agreement of 15 May of this year, member-states of the commonwealth on whose territory Russian servicemen are serving will provide mandatory personal insurance at the expense of their own budgets without payments between states.

Concerning servicemen serving in military units under the jurisdiction of Russia located on the territory of states not bound by the above-mentioned agreement, in accordance with an interim procedure adopted, to resolve the issue of payment of insurance amounts they should contact the social security offices specially created in these regions or the command authorities of the military units, to whom the procedure for granting the documents necessary in these instances will be conveyed in the near future.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] As we know, on 21 October 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation passed a law increasing state pensions in the Russian Federation 2.5-fold. In this regard, I would like to know: What steps are being taken by the Ministry of Defense to improve pensions for veterans of the Army and Navy?

[Vorobyev] We are constantly working in this direction. The pensions granted by the Ministry of Defense were recalculated three times this year alone on 1 January, 1 July, and 1 August, which made it possible in the existing economic conditions to increase significantly the social protection of veterans of the armed forces and their family members.

Presently the Supreme Soviet of Russia is considering a draft law of the Russian Federation on servicemen's pensions, which is proposed to be implemented on 1 January 1993. The draft law contains a number of new rates aimed at increasing the level of pensions for servicemen. In particular, it calls for increasing the amount of the pension for 20 years of service from 40 to 50 percent of a serviceman's pay and allowances, which is especially important for officers being discharged from the service in connection with the reduction in the armed forces.

In connection with the passage of the Law of the Russian Federation on Increasing State Pensions by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on 21 October 1992, which is to increase pensions for workers and employees 2.5-fold, the Ministry of Defense together with other interested ministries and departments has prepared for submission to the Government of Russia a draft decree on increasing pensions of military retirees. It is now in coordination. We hope that our proposals will find support in the government bodies.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Inflation and increases in prices for essential goods also affect the standard of living of civilian personnel of the armed forces. Are some kind of measures provided for social protection and increasing the wages of this category of workers?

[Vorobyev] In accordance with Decree No 785 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 14 October 1992, as in the entire budget sphere of the national economy, preparatory work is being conducted in the Ministry of Defense for introducing a single 18-bracket wage scale. An

order will be issued by the minister of defense of the Russian Federation on this matter in the near future.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is the essence of this measure?

[Vorobyev] First, the existing wage system is being considerably standardized and simplified. Second, unlike the presently existing sector configuration of salaries, wage brackets from 1 to 18 and rate coefficients for them are being introduced for all categories of workers. The monthly rate for a 1st bracket will be R1800 effective 1 December 1992. In order to determine the rate, for example, of a 10th bracket worker, the R1800 should be multiplied by the rate coefficient for this bracket, which is 3.99. Third, before the single wage scale is instituted, all categories of workers must be certified. According to the results of the certification, a specific bracket is awarded in accordance with the established qualification requirements for each position. Fourth and finally, with the introduction of this scale it is envisioned that the wages will increase an average of 50 percent.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] As before, the housing problem remains the most critical problem, and especially bothers those servicemen who serve outside of Russia.

[Vorobyev] A number of decisions by the President and the Government of Russia adopted this year are aimed at solving the housing problem in the Army and Navy. The latest decision is the allocation of currency funds to the Ministry of Defense. This money, according to the order of the minister of defense just signed, will go to providing housing for servicemen of military units being withdrawn from nearby foreign areas and that have gotten into difficult worldly situations and also for providing monetary assistance to very needy servicemen.

It is a question of additional acquisition of housing for servicemen of units and formations being withdrawn from the Baltic states, republics of the Transcaucasus, and other regions of the former USSR with an unstable socio-political situation. This is primarily for those who are in need of housing, taking into account the composition of the family (three or more children) and the health of the serviceman, his wife, and children. Some of these funds will be provided as monetary assistance to those who have suffered in accidents and natural disasters or have lost personal things as a result of armed conflicts or during shipment.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] With the adoption of the Edict of the President of Russia of 21 July 1992, there has been a noticeable increase in servicemen's interest in construction of individual and cooperative housing. At the same time, in a number of letters our readers complain about the difficulties in joining housing construction (housing) cooperatives and receiving credit for construction of an individual house. What is the problem here?

[Vorobyev] Increasing the amount of free financial assistance to servicemen accomplishing cooperative and individual housing construction from 50 to 75 percent of the cost of cooperative housing or bank credit allotted for these purposes, naturally, has expanded the ranks of those wishing to participate in these forms of construction. The lines to join cooperatives and receive land plots and bank credits have grown.

In connection with the migratory processes on the territory of the former USSR, many servicemen being discharged into the reserve or retiring prefer their permanent residence to be not their last duty station but other regions, including outside the Russian Federation. At the same time, under the housing legislation there are certain restrictions on joining a cooperative or receiving plots of land for individual housing construction in the absence of a residence permit in the populated areas chosen for future residence.

Incidentally, in accordance with Edict No 796 of the President of Russia of 21 July 1992, free financial assistance to servicemen accomplishing cooperative and individual housing construction in an area other than their duty location may be provided only when the right to such construction is granted by legislation in force.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The presently existing rates of monetary compensation for servicemen without apartments have practically lost their value under the effect of inflation. Officers S. Miroshnikov (Transbaykal MD) and N. Kozlov (Volga MD) write about this in particular. Is anything planned in terms of material support of servicemen forced to rent private housing?

[Vorobyev] This is indeed a very painful issue. Judge for yourself: in Moscow an acceptable price for renting a two-room flat now, which is evidenced by numerous advertisements, is considered R5000 to R8000 per month. Temporary housing is not any cheaper in St Petersburg either. In other populated areas, as our analysis shows, these prices vary from R1000 to R4000 per month. Not every servicemen is able to support in his family budget such an expenditure item that encompasses half or more of his pay.

It cannot be said that the Ministry of Defense is not taking any steps at all in this direction. Proposals to increase the rates of monetary compensation were submitted to government agencies of Russia back in August 1992 in an overall package of documents for increasing the pay and allowances of servicemen.

I am still hoping that the Government of Russia will find it possible to provide material support for the least socially protected personnel of the Army and Navy—servicemen without apartments.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One measure of social protection of families of servicemen in the conditions of the transition to a market economy is establishing the payment of monetary compensation to unemployed wives of officer personnel, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel. In what cases is this compensation paid? Yu. Potseluyev from Azerbaijan, A. Nasanovich from Maritime Kray, L. Strakhatova from Tula Oblast, and other readers would like to receive an answer to this question.

[Vorobyev] Monthly compensation payments to unemployed wives of servicemen were introduced by the former union government back in March 1991. However, owing to known political and economic reasons, certain changes were subsequently made to the procedure for granting the payments and the compensation rates.

Today, these compensation payments are made to unemployed wives of servicemen residing at their husband's place of duty in remote garrisons and localities where there is no opportunity for them to find employment. The lists of these

garrisons and military units are disseminated to the troops by orders of the district and fleet commanders.

When preparing the lists, they take into account the remoteness of military unit locations from populated areas, the existing demand for a labor force in a given region, and certain other factors. All military units of Russian troops located outside of Russia, including in nearby foreign countries, are considered as being located in remote garrisons and localities where there is no opportunity to find employment.

The amounts of the payments change periodically in connection with the indexation being conducted. The rate of R300 has been in effect since June of this year.

As far as the specific procedure for granting and paying the compensation is concerned, it is covered in more detail in Order No 185 of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation of 15 October 1992.

In concluding our conversation, I would like to emphasize that all the letters that are received at our main directorate are examined in detail. This distinctive but sensitive barometer helps us to accomplish many tasks.

I would like to note that it is very important to see that decisions are made, but it is equally critical to ensure their implementation and to bring to every serviceman the established rates of allowances, benefits, and advantages.

In this connection, I appeal to commanders of all levels and to financial service personnel, on whom timely implementation of the decisions being made largely depend. There are not and cannot be any trivialities in this work, since behind every decision are people with their problems and concerns. I hope for mutual understanding, since we all are doing one common job for the good of servicemen and their families.

Losses of Material Up 87 Percent

93UM0088A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major Ivan Ivanyuk in the column "Behind the Directive": "Protect What You Have"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Colonel General V. Toporov, deputy minister of defense, Russian Federation, has issued a directive on improving the security of material resources in rear services.

The breakdown in the country's economic machinery is so pronounced that increase in economic crimes is accepted as inevitable. The Armed Forces could not escape being drawn into this process.

Thus, according to information gathered by the military procuracy, from the beginning of this year, Russian Army losses and thefts of property, food supplies, fuel, and other material resources have risen by 87 percent, with some losses showing a three-fold increase. The financial damage associated with these losses multiplied by a factor of 10 in relative price terms. In the first six months of 1992 in the rear service alone, this amounted to 42.4 million rubles, of which the value of clothing accounted for 30.9 million rubles.

Most unfavorable is the security of issue items of clothing in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, Far Eastern Military District, and Northwestern Group of Forces.

The above-cited figures may create the impression that the losses occur largely in clothing items. The latter in fact do constitute the easiest target for dishonest persons and tend to become misplaced more often than other items. However, the cost of the lost property is most adversely affected by prices of items of the military uniform, which have exhibited an increase several times by a factor of 10 in the recent past. Thefts proper however are unfortunately occurring in other rear services as well. Checks and inspections carried out in the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets and in the Leningrad Military District have uncovered instances of illegal sales of food supplies, fuel, and materials to outside organizations and private persons.

In the Pacific Ocean Fleet, for example, this activity was performed in grand style. Officials of the Mine and Torpedo Directorate headed by Rear Admiral V. Kurochkin set up an entire network of limited-responsibility associations to resell military property. This commercial activity carried out by merchants wearing the uniform cost the state 1.8 million rubles.

To realize their personal economic interests, officials in line units at times set up "chains," thus involving outside organizations in a criminal activity. Thus, Colonel A. Kozlov, chief engineer of a military unit subordinated to the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, entered into a kind of family contract arrangement. He assisted his wife, who was the manager of a small enterprise, in selling angle iron to a hydrolysis plant, then to a cooperative. The procuracy is presently investigating the military units involved in this scheme.

Additional cases may be cited, but even the above two are sufficient to point out the low state of operational discipline existing in some places and the absence of suitable controls.

The system of guarding rear service facilities is unsatisfactory. A large number of them is not included on the list of secure facilities, a situation that is highly unfortunate in this time of extreme shortages.

As before, a large amount of property falls easy victim to fire. Fires broke out this year in depots and other rear service facilities of the Leningrad, Siberian, and Far Eastern Military Districts, the Western and Northwestern Groups of Forces, and the Pacific and Northern Fleets.

Correction of poor management; elimination of illegality in use of military property; and the application of additional measures for strict accounting and security of property—those are the tasks set forth in the Russian Federation deputy defense minister's directive for implementation by commanders and chiefs at all levels. These problems cannot be resolved by act of will alone, of course. It is necessary to reinforce the material base of rear services and improve technical security at depots and other facilities; and rear service workers must learn to work under the new command conditions. This is also addressed in the directive.

Currency Help for Returning Servicemen With Special Needs

PM1611151192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Nov 92 p 2

[Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Service report: "Currency Appropriations Allocated for Urgent Needs"]

[Text] Given the extremely difficult situation surrounding the withdrawal of troops and naval forces from the states of the Baltic and the republics of the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and other regions of the former USSR, and given the unstable situation which obtains, foreign currency appropriations are to be allocated by the president and the government at the request of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to speed

up the solution of the housing problem and provide urgent aid to servicemen in special need.

The relevant order "On the Use of the Foreign Currency Resources Allocated To Acquire Housing and Provide Monetary Aid to Servicemen in Need" was signed by Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev on 12 November.

These resources are directed toward the acquisition of additional apartments for servicemen being withdrawn who require expeditious provision of housing (because of their family circumstances, state of health, or material situation). Some of the aforementioned resources will be used to provide monetary help to servicemen affected by accident, natural disaster, or illness or who are wounded or lose personal effects as a result of armed conflicts, during transfer, and so forth.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Two Day Battle in Dushanbe

93UM0157A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Oct 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vladimir Urban and Anatoliy Ladin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "Two Days of Fighting in Dushanbe: The Russian Military Managed To Prevent a Massive Slaughter"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already repeatedly predicted the offensive by the Kulyab supporters of ex-president Rakhmon Nabiyev. After seizing the initiative in the south of the republic, it was clear that they would certainly join their northern allies in Khudzhand (Leninabad). And this path, as we know, runs through Dushanbe.

The turmoil in the capital began back on 18 October, when armed people from Kulyab formations burst into Yavan, which is separated from Dushanbe by only a mountain pass. True, on 22 October, Acting President Akbarsho Iskandarov gave instructions to motorized subunits of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Security Committee to take under guard all main highways leading to the capital. In the areas of Nurek and Yavan, work began to create a buffer zone for bringing peacemaking forces into the republic. But it was already doubtful that this could change the situation.

On Thursday, the armed supporters of Nabiyev (numbering about 1,000) were concentrated at Char-Char Pass. On Friday, the Kulyab supporters had complete control of Kolkhozabad, had taken Nurek, and had approached Ordzhonikidzeabad. That is to say, the opponents of Iskandarov had begun to carry out their plan.

Then, on Saturday morning, armed formations of the Gissar and Kulyab militia entered Dushanbe and took by storm the presidential residence, the Supreme Soviet building, and the kaziyata (spiritual administration). The leaders of the attackers, the former Speaker of Parliament Safarali Kenzhayev and Rustam Abdurakhimov (according to some reports, on Sunday he was captured by fundamentalists and executed) stated that the government that was in operation until May of this year will be restored in the republic.

At 0425 hours (Moscow time) on 24 October, Kenzhayev and Abdurakhimov arrived at the headquarters of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. Since television and radio were under protection of the Russian military by that time, they demanded that they be given the opportunity to address the people over television.

Akbarsho Iskandarov was also at the division headquarters at the time. After consulting with him, the deputy chairman of the State Emergency Committee of Russia, Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Tkachev, told a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent that we—the deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev, and I—suggested that Kenzhayev and Abdurakhimov make an address over television together with Iskandarov. But such an address did not take place.

At 0530 hours, Kenzhayev spoke on the radio on his own. However, he did not explain the purpose of his "march on Dushanbe," did not put forth any program, and did not nominate anyone for temporary leadership.

It appears, the Russian military believe, that he simply was not ready for this.

Meanwhile, intense consultations with representatives of both sides continued at the division headquarters. Iskandarov was willing to negotiate. However, the chairman of the Kulyab Oblast Executive Committee, Rizoyev, categorically rejected the very idea of a truce and stated that the Kulyab supporters would fight until they won. The muslim leader of Tajikistan, Khadzhi Akbar Turadzhonzod, also rejected negotiations.

But it later turned out that the situation in Dushanbe was changing. The Kulyab supporters did not receive the expected reinforcements from Ordzhonikidzeabad and Kurgan-Tyube. Then, it also became known that a session of the oblast soviet was held in the administrative center of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, at which they declared neutrality in the situation.

In Dushanbe itself, the clergy and the supporters of Iskandarov managed to concentrate enough forces to gain considerable advantage over the Kulyab supporters. On the morning of 25 October, the Supreme Soviet and the presidential palace were tightly surrounded, and continuous fire was delivered against the defending forces. Their fate was practically predetermined.

Therefore, on the morning of 25 October, Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev again came forth with an initiative for new negotiations between Iskandarov and Kenzhayev. A meeting again took place at the division headquarters, during which an agreement was reached to conduct a session of the Supreme Soviet in Leninabad in the next few days.

Almost immediately after the meeting, Kenzhayev turned to Colonel-General Vorobyev with a request to save his people who were surrounded. Finally, through mediation of the military, they were able to reach a cease-fire agreement. An armored group of the 201st Division moved up to the Supreme Soviet. KamAZ vehicles moved under its guard. They managed to load Kenzhayev's fighters, virtually doomed to death, into the trucks and transport them to the vicinity of Gissar.

Soon Kenzhayev's fighters also abandoned the presidential palace without any losses. As we can see, it was thanks to the Russian military that a massive slaughter was prevented in Dushanbe. Armed clashes were virtually halted by 26 October.

Akbarsho Iskandarov was again at the division headquarters on Monday morning. The point was that the session was to take place. Former President Rakhmon Nabiyev himself, as before, remains in Leninabad. Rumors that he was planning to go to Dushanbe are only rumors, Lieutenant-General Tkachev said in conclusion.

The center of the capital, where the traces of the two days of fighting are still fresh, looks depressing. Some of the buildings have been destroyed, and the corpses have not yet been taken away on the city streets. Public transportation is not operating, electric power lines have been cut, and stores, institutions, schools, and enterprises other than the bakery are closed.

Chronicle of Events in Ingushetia-Ossetia Conflict
93UM0136A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Pelts, Vasily Fatigarov and Aleksey Petrov: "All Hopes Are on the Stabilizing Role of Russian Forces: A Chronicle of Events in the Area of the Ingushetian-Ossetian Conflict"]

[Text] For the second day a state of emergency is being maintained over the territory of the North Ossetian SSR and the Ingushetian Republic.

For a second day Russian airborne troops and internal troop subunits are operating in the area of the conflict (Prigorodnyy Rayon, Vladikavkaz) in accordance with an edict of the Russian president. They are carrying out a dangerous, very complex but extremely necessary job in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingushetian conflict.

Our correspondent reports from Vladikavkaz that decisive and aggressive actions by Russian forces are producing the desired results. Fighting between Ossetians and Ingushetians has died down. Only local exchanges of fire have been noted in the region today.

The situation yesterday, our correspondent reports, developed as follows. Two battalions of a composite airborne-assault landing regiment under the command of Colonel Ivan Komar were sent to the vicinity of the population center of Chermen, where a real danger to the lives of Ossetians residing in this region had arisen.

Three BMDs (airborne fighting vehicles) advanced as scouts were stopped by the explosion of a mine at the approach to the bridge at Chermen. The airborne troops cleared the obstruction created by the mine and came up to the positions of the Ingushetians. Colonel Komar entered into negotiations with the leader of the Ingushetian irregulars, Ruslan Dobriyev. Unfortunately the negotiations broke down. The joint command decided to crush the resistance.

Refusing to surrender their arms, the Ingushetians suffered losses in manpower and equipment. Tanks, guns and mortars were destroyed. Unfortunately, three servicemen of the airborne regiment were also killed, and four were wounded, including an officer. All were from a separate reconnaissance company.

At 1000 on the morning of 3 November a message came in from the regiment commander that the Ingushetians had agreed to fulfill the demands of the Russian airborne forces. Airborne forces deputy commander Major General Aleksandr Chindarov demanded that the Ingushetian fighters first put down their arms, decisively emphasizing that until they surrendered their arms, there would be no negotiations.

At the moment this issue was being signed to press the editor's office had no information on the results of the negotiations. However, it is known that residents of Ossetian nationality were taken from Chermen and the settlement of Dachnoye to Vladikavkaz, and they are now under the protection of our forces and Ossetian militia formations.

Subunits of the internal troops are also conducting aggressive and decisive actions to suppress local centers of resistance. They are required to carry out their mission in a very

complex situation, inasmuch as fighters on both sides are operating unconventionally, seizing hostages and using women and children for cover. They have but one demand—weapons. The most dramatic events developed in the training center of the internal forces school of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kozhgaron [city name illegible]. Using women and children as their cover, Ossetian fighters were able to seize some weapons.

Still, it can be asserted that on the whole, the situation has stabilized. Russian airborne forces and subunits of the internal troops have the situation under control, and they are monitoring it, keeping the civil war from growing any larger. According to a report from an ITAR-TASS correspondent an extraordinary commission to resolve the conflict, established in Nazran, has begun work. It is chaired by Russian People's Deputy Bembulat Bogatyrev. Under the leadership of Ruslan Aushev the Ingushetian side is now conducting negotiations with Ossetians on exchanging hostages and prisoners. Said-Mogomed Chupayev, a representative of the Ingushetian defense headquarters, stated that not less than 500 persons of Ingushetian nationality were being held hostage in Ossetia. For the most part these are people who were returning home from Russia but who were detained in Mineralnyye Vody and in Vladikavkaz.

The interim administration of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, headed by Vice Prime Minister Georgiy Khizha of the Russian government, is also working actively to prevent further bloodshed. In particular a demand by authorities in North Ossetia to distribute arms among the republic's inhabitants for self-defense, made of the command of the internal forces of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, was resolutely rejected. Internal forces commander Colonel General Vasily Savvin emphasized that participation of untrained 17-year-old boys in any combat activities was unacceptable.

Russian servicemen have everything they need to stabilize the situation. According to a report from our correspondents, men and equipment are continuing to accumulate in the places of deployment of airborne forces and internal troop subunits. Major General Aleksandr Chindarov, deputy commander of the Russian airborne forces, announced from Vladikavkaz that Russian forces were fulfilling the mission of pacifying nationalistic irregulars who had thrown aside all restraint and who were transgressing upon the lives of Russian citizens and the territorial integrity of the state.

Russia is also providing help to those who suffered in the course of the Ossetian-Ingushetian conflict. It became known that Yegor Gaydar, acting chairman of the Russian government, gave orders for a special airplane to fly from Moscow to North Ossetia with physicians from the Emergency Medical Care Center and the necessary medicines aboard. In the opinion of center director Boris Varava, medical assistance will be rendered to all requiring it, regardless of nationality. This will be timely assistance, because there are many wounded, sick and refugees in the region. According to information from the Russian Federation State Committee on States of Emergency, up to a thousand and a half Ingushetian refugees have accumulated just at one of the military units of the Russian Army.

And now about the most painful, the most bitter. Russia must know the names of its sons who paid with their lives for cessation of the senseless bloodshed, and for the tranquillity and territorial integrity of the fatherland.

Airborne Troops:

Sergeant Vladimir Savchinskiy

Junior Sergeant Andrey Pomeshkin

Private Aleksandr Suvorov

Representatives of internal troops:

VVVKU [not further identified] Cadet Dmitriy Bazarov

VVVKU Cadet Arkhadiy Teptyayev

Sergeant Ivan Volkov

Evacuation of Poti Garrison

93UM0137A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Pasyakin: "Evacuation Continues Despite Gunfire and a Blockade"]

[Text] The Georgian side continues to hinder evacuation of the families of servicemen from the Poti Garrison.

"Last Saturday and Sunday," said Captain 2d Rank Vasilii Kishin, commander of a ship brigade in Poti, "the new port where our ships and vessels are based was subjected to gunfire. The situation is also complicated by the fact that the fire is around the clock, and it intensifies at night. It has become impossible to provide normal navigation support to shipping. The problem is that navigation equipment has been plundered and rendered useless, and consequently movement of vessels and ships has become a problem, and it can proceed as a rule only during the day. Still, despite everything, the evacuation of servicemen and their families is continuing. For example on 31 October the hydrographic vessel Ay-Todor and the large amphibious ship Krymskiy Komsomolets left Poti with 102 families aboard. They are now unloading in Novorossiysk."

Captain 1st Rank Yuriy Nichik, chief of the Black Sea Fleet's command post, offered a general description of the evacuation in which the fleet is participating.

"We finished the evacuation from Sukhumi," said Yuriy Mikhaylovich. "The crews of the search and rescue vessels Baskunchak and Daurnya fulfilled their mission despite the opposition of Georgian armed formations and even gunfire on the Baskunchak. As of 1 November, 1,204 persons were evacuated from the sanatorium belonging to the Moscow Air Defense District.

Officials View Suspension of Baltic Troop Withdrawal

93UM0142A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Nov 92 p 3

[Interview with Lt Gen Fedor Melnichuk, first deputy commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, and Georgs Stirlaitis, chief of the Planning Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, by Col

Vadim Solovyev under the rubric "A Problem": "The Withdrawal of Russian Troops From the Baltic Area: Two Views on a Single Issue"]

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic area is taking on a more and more dramatic tinge by the day. Russian President Boris Yeltsin recently ordered the suspension of the troop withdrawal, claiming wholesale violations of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries. At the same time the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] has explained through Deputy Minister Anatoliy Churkin that the suspension has nothing to do with any other issue.

The situation is becoming more and more confusing by the day. We continue to devote a great deal of attention to the withdrawal of the troops from the Baltic area and today we are publishing the opinion of the two parties obviously most concerned: the command element of Russian troops in the Baltic area (headquartered in Riga) and the military leadership of one of the Baltic countries, Lithuania.

Evaluating the situation surrounding the Russian troops in the Baltic countries, Lt Gen Fedor Melnichuk, first deputy commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, commented that he could not say the job was bringing a great deal of satisfaction but that duty requires him to perform it conscientiously. The morale of the officers and warrant officers is alarming, and this is affecting also the enlisted personnel. It is caused mainly by the uncertainty and the unplanned nature of our work. The military are not accustomed to working without a plan, although we do understand all of the political issues to one extent or another. I will frankly say that this is disturbing those of us in charge. We began by scheduling the withdrawal for 1998, then moved it up to 1997, then 1996. We have now lost even these guidelines. The troop withdrawal is being carried out to the extent that it is possible, however.

[Solovyev] How many troops have already been withdrawn?

[Melnichuk] Around 40 percent have been withdrawn from all the republics within a brief period of time.

[Solovyev] But what about recent instructions to suspend the withdrawal for those going to areas without housing?

[Melnichuk] We take them as a demand that the work be stepped up in the new areas where the troops will be stationed. We have had some experience in removing troops to new locations, only to find nothing or almost nothing built there. While there are some facilities for housing the equipment and the personnel, practically nothing has been built to accommodate the officers' families—only barracks at best. I am not even talking about schools and children's facilities. This is an enormous problem. One can also empathize with the local authorities in one of the rayons in Leningrad Oblast, who have found themselves with 300 school children of servicemen. For the local authorities—no one warned them—this was like having snow dumped on them in the middle of summer.

Housing is our most acute problem. In Lithuania the situation is clear. An officer sells an apartment there and is able to buy an apartment in Russia with the money he receives. In Latvia and Estonia a decision was adopted—and the reasons are clear—to declare all of our apartments to be service apartments, including those in which retired military personnel are living. Housing is being nationalized.

How can this be, when the money for housing construction has recently been taken from the treasury of the Ministry of Defense? And the worst thing is that when officers and warrant officers are replaced, it is absolutely forbidden to move the new arrivals into their housing.

[Solovyev] And what are the command element and the Ministry of Defense doing about this?

[Melnichuk] We have been authorized by the Russian government to sell written-off and obsolete equipment. We have the proceeds from this. Most of them are going for the purchase of apartments in Russia. Today we need 1,870 apartments just for those who are being released from the military service, and also for other categories of military personnel. At the present time we have paid for 543 apartments. In addition, the Ministry of Defense has allocated 78 million rubles for the purchase of apartments for our servicemen. We are alarmed by the fact that while six months ago a square meter of housing cost 15,000 rubles, the cost has now gone up to 27,000-32,000. We can still acquire housing in the rural area for 17,000. This means that the number of apartments which can be purchased with the allocated funds is being cut in half.

[Solovyev] Let us get back to the situation of the military personnel here in the Baltic countries. Their financial situation, for example.

[Melnichuk] Let people denounce me for this, but I can say that it was easier for us in the military to exchange rubles for local currency a couple of months ago than it is now. Some sort of dirty trick is being played. In Latvia the ruble's rate was previously 0.6, then 0.5, and it is now 0.45. And that is not the bottom. Not long ago we were issuing half of the officers' pay in local money. Only a third is in local money today. Due to the exchange rate the officer actually receives 3,000 rubles instead of the 7,000 due him. The Russian government is trying to help. Not long ago Prime Minister Gaydar was personally dealing with this matter. We are still not getting the help which should have been forthcoming, however.

[Solovyev] What are relations with the local population like?

[Melnichuk] The anti-army propaganda supported by the leaders of some republics is a great impediment. It is stepped up mainly during various election campaigns. Most of the population of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia treat the Russian troops all right, though. Youth between the ages of 18 and 22 are the most negative, and they account for most of the protestors.

[Solovyev] From Moscow one has the impression that there is an insurmountable wall between the Russian command element in the Baltic area and the local authorities. Is that so?

[Melnichuk] It is possible to work with all the Baltic republics and their leaders. And we are. Our working relations are best with the government of the Lithuanian Republic. Nor can one say that the leaders of Latvia and Estonia are doing nothing. They are meeting us half-way. We are resolving such issues as the provision of food, water and heat, and other basic matters fairly well on the basis of reciprocal agreements at the local level. It is only natural

that more troops have been withdrawn today from Lithuania, where they are doing more to meet us half-way, than from Latvia or Estonia.

The greatest difficulty in our work stems from the fact that laws are passed unilaterally by the leaders of Latvia and Estonia, without coordinating them with the Russian military. In private conversations, however, it is acknowledged that this is not legal. Those with whom I have confidential relations admit: "Fedor Ivanovich, we are deliberately trying to make it intolerable for you." We did not hear this sort of thing in the past, but we are hearing it more and more frequently today.

[Solovyev] You have served a fairly long time in these parts and should know the local conditions and the people well. In your opinion, how should all the problems be resolved?

[Melnichuk] Since we are building a democratic state, we need to do things by agreement. It is my opinion that it is better to work things out by agreement than through confrontation.

[Solovyev] When do you think the last Russian soldier will be able to leave the Baltic area?

[Melnichuk] It is for the Ministry of Defense to decide when the last soldier leaves the Baltic countries, of course. I would consider it an honor to leave with him. I would like for this to occur sometime around 1996.

Georgs Stirlais, chief of the Planning Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, does not conceal the fact that he regards the Russian troops as troops of a foreign state, which must be removed as rapidly as possible. Latvia's parliament has decided that this should occur within a year, by the beginning of fall, 1993.

[Solovyev] The Latvian parliament made this absolute decision without coordinating it with the Russian side.

[Stirlais] The schedule has indeed not yet been coordinated. We know that Russia had proposed completing the troop withdrawal during the period 1997-1999. Russia's position then changed suddenly, and it agreed to withdraw the troops by 1994. Mutual understanding has not been reached on this matter. It would be difficult to say what the prospects are, but I hope that a mutually acceptable decision can be found, since Russia accepted that commitment at the Conference on Security and Cooperation.

[Solovyev] The troop withdrawal is linked to human rights violations in the Baltic countries.

[Stirlais] I do not think it is valid to link the two issues: troop withdrawal and human rights. In our opinion, the question of the observance of human rights is a concocted one, and if there are some problems in this respect, they should be resolved separately. The matter of the withdrawal should be decided independently of other issues.

[Solovyev] But what about the rights of retired personnel in Latvia, for example?

[Stirlais] These are common problems, regardless of whether the people are under the Russian Ministry of Defense or the Latvian state. The question is whether their minimum pension is enough for survival. We feel that the Russian state should take care of pensioners of the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR, since it is Russia which has

declared itself the heir to the former Soviet Union. This status involves not only advantages, but obligations as well. And it is very important that Russia conduct an unequivocal policy.

[Solovyev] What are your relations with the local Russian command element like?

[Stirlais] I feel that it is easier to find a common language here than at the general state level, at which a mutually acceptable solution has not been found.

[Solovyev] And what, in your opinion, is preventing this?

[Stirlais] The main thing is to have equal partners at the negotiating table. If one party feels that it has the right to talk down to the smaller one, probably nothing will come of it. Just how did little Latvia dare to make demands of Russia, for example, or does Russia have some sort of strategic interests in the Baltic area, including Latvia, even though Latvia has no strategic interests in Russia? Where is the equality of the partners at the negotiating table?

[Solovyev] The opinion persists that the troop withdrawal is being retarded by a disinclination on the part of Latvia to create normal living conditions for the families of officers and warrant officers departing your area. The best possible solution has been found for those remaining in Latvia, after all.

[Stirlais] The decisions should be fairly constructive in principle. There has been a lot of talk about the construction of housing for the departing troops. Unfortunately, Russia is dragging its feet in indicating the sites where apartment buildings or housing complexes could be built. A number of Western states are prepared to finance the construction of housing for Russian officers and warrant officers. Latvia is prepared to supply the work force, of which it has a surplus, for the construction. We have waited a long time for Russia's response, however. The people are ultimately the victims.

Progress of Russian-Lithuanian Ships for Housing Deal Viewed

93UM0142B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Valeriy Gromak: "Lithuania Will Build Housing for the Baltic Fleet If it Receives Several Ships in Exchange"]

[Text] We have long known that talks were underway between the command element of the Baltic Fleet and Lithuania's Ministry of National Defense on the construction of housing for military personnel. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has reported on this. Let us recall a few details, however.

At the beginning of September the Ostankino television company broadcast a report on a Kaliningrad press conference on an agreement between Lithuania's Selma association and the Baltic Fleet on the construction of housing for servicemen in Kaliningrad Oblast. Following the conference KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondence office was flooded with letters from military personnel. They all essentially asked the same question: When will we receive apartments in these buildings? As a result of the withdrawal of

fleet forces from the Baltic countries and Poland the housing problem has become considerably more acute.

I want to say at the outset that the issue is still open, although a protocol of intent was signed in Vilnius at the beginning of last year on social and economic cooperation between the Baltic Fleet and the government of Lithuania. Based on this document the Latvian side expressed interest in a barter deal in which Lithuania would be sold several ships, items of equipment and weapons in exchange for building a housing development in Kaliningrad.

Army Gen Pavel Grachev, Russia's minister of defense, and Lithuania's Minister of National Defense Audrius Butkevicius met in Moscow in May of this year. Following the meeting orders were issued to sell the Lithuanian side two torpedo boats, two small ASW ships, a hydrographic vessel (mainly obsolete items) and a certain quantity of gear. It was planned to pay for the ships and equipment by building housing for personnel of the Baltic Fleet.

I was informed at Baltic Fleet headquarters that after the matter was cleared through Vladimir Shumayko, first deputy chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, the fleet's command element concluded a sale/purchase contract. The transaction was not consummated on the date set, 30 September, however, even though a representative of the Baltic Fleet had signed a bilateral document on the transfer of the ships on 25 September. What happened?

The time factor went into play, as they say. While all the talks were underway and the contracts were being signed, the government of the Russian Federation issued orders (closed to the press) which authorized the Russian Navy to sell excess ships and vessels for export only through the state Spetsvneshtekhnika company of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Trade. It was only natural, then, it would seem, that when Georgiy Khizha, deputy chairman of the government, learned of the impending sale of the ships to Lithuania from the Baltic Fleet's report to the Russian State Committee on Property, he suspended implementation of the agreement until the matter could be reviewed by the Interdepartmental Commission on Technical Military Cooperation With Foreign Countries.

Every such transaction must have a legal basis, of course. According to reports acquired by the editors, no one in Moscow was particularly opposed to the Baltic Fleet's agreement with the Lithuanian government. It is still not clear, however, why this matter is to be reviewed by the interdepartmental commission. Our Russian government clearly has more than enough problems right now. It should obviously also be borne in mind, though, that the problem of obtaining housing for several thousand families of Russian sailors is also a priority.

In the meantime, several large trucks and trailers have arrived in Kaliningrad from Lithuania. They carried carpentry materials and plumbing items for the apartment buildings which Lithuania's Selma association is soon to build.

This freight was to have been delivered a month ago, to be sure.

What has held up the project? I addressed this question to Adm Vladimir Yegorov, commander of the Baltic Fleet.

"It has been held up by formalities," Vladimir Grigoryevich said, confirming my own thoughts, "which should have been resolved at the level of the Russian government. We believe that the lost time will be made up by a greater effort on the part of the Lithuanian construction workers, however. Despite all the difficulties, they remain committed to the agreement.

We know that Lithuania has promised to release the first apartment building for fleet families by May of next year. I therefore asked Selma President Vldas Laurinavicius whether the month's delay would affect the construction schedule.

"If there are no further problems," Mr. Laurinavicius said, "we shall catch up. Right now Lithuania has run out of energy. The plants which produce the construction materials for the fleet's future apartment buildings are also on the verge of coming to a halt. In the near future we will be going to the Russian government for help in resolving the energy problems of these plants."

UKRAINE

Morozov on Army's Status on First Anniversary

93UM0098A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
20 Oct 92 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian defense minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov by unnamed correspondent; place and date not given: "A Sense of Responsibility..."]

[Text] It was just a year ago that development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was started, and the parliament assigned Konstantin Petrovich Morozov to head this. Much has been done; much more remains to be done. And now we have the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers.... So how does Colonel General Konstantin Morozov, who has given so much to build Ukraine's own army, feel about things, and what are his concerns? The minister willingly responded to these and other questions from our correspondent.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Konstantin Petrovich, following the adoption by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet of the well-known decree of no confidence in the government, in certain circles a rumor was immediately circulated that you would resign. Can you please tell us how things worked during this period?

[Morozov] Rumors are rumors. Some also affected me, of course, from the newspapers. As you can see, I have a calm attitude toward my work; nothing has changed—the same kind of stressful day.

Recently in particular, there have been many serious meetings and talks and discussions with my deputies about current issues.

At the latest collegium we reviewed the reasons for the loss by some officials of vigilance in matters pertaining to the safe storage of weapons and ammunition, and we are continuing this now. There is constant evaluation of the situation and decision making on matters pertaining to creating the structures of the Armed Forces and organizational support for them; there are very many problems here. I think that we are starting to move toward concrete decisions on funding for housing construction at the level of

a state program. It is a matter of major credit for the Ministry of Defense under the cottage construction plan on which we are working. I have met with the representatives of the Ukrainian president in the cities, and with the chairmen of the oblast soviets; they support it and are even allocating plots of land for construction. Nikolayev Oblast provided the first example.

Work was recently completed on orders of the Ministry of Defense for industry for 1993, and they have been passed on to the Cabinet of Ministers. I want to propose to enterprise directors that we meet in order to learn their opinions and to listen to criticisms and demands; this is all very necessary. Such meetings used to take place, but not often. Now there is more clarity in the situation, and I am learning to look further ahead.

Problems with the Black Sea Fleet. They are endless. The fates of people who have taken the oath, combining the schools, control, and measures to safeguard state property. And simultaneously, formation of the Ukrainian naval command.

As a permanent member of the Security Council and Defense Council, I am obliged to make preparations to review questions and to report the conclusions and proposals on decisions to the president of Ukraine.

I therefore believe that no changes have taken place in my work. I work as I used to work. The army has many problems, and they must be dealt with constantly.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] There has recently been an increase in the number of concerned appeals being made to us in the editorial offices. Officers are concerned about the work of the socio-psychological service. Can you tell us how the concept for the service was developed and the prospects for its organization?

[Morozov] The service has not yet been set up. Much time has been taken in setting it up because of the complexities in work on the concept. We are all afraid of making a mistake in the new one as we did in the past. It was for this reason that for a long time there was no precise understanding of the structures and functions and of procedure for implementing them.

One version of the concept was worked out right at the beginning of the year. It was published in NARODNA ARMIYA and discussed and critiqued. We did not reach an unambiguous conclusion in this matter. And in order to avoid mistakes, we offered it as a basis for discussion in a Supreme Soviet commission. Experts from institutions of the Ministry of Education and the institutes were invited to the commission. We took counsel with commanders. The work continues. The divergence of opinion remains even today. For example, experts believe that the post of chief of the service should be as a deputy [commander], but commanders see this as a repetition of the past.

I believe that only those who because of their specialty, length of service, and experience really can substitute for a commander or commanding officer should be deputies. In my opinion these are the chief of staff and one deputy from the command ladder.

In accordance with the 25 September 1992 edict of the president of Ukraine, these changes are already being made

in the Ministry of Defense. We are carrying them out in the districts and armies, and at lower levels. But the socio-psychological service should operate at the corresponding levels—district, army, and so forth—without subordination along the vertical. And civilian experts could work in it. The main thing here is not power functions, but work with the individual and helping him in life and work in a milieu and living conditions that are not always comfortable.

That is my view of the prospects. Of course, argument and substantiation are essential in order to realize them. I think that I have them.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Do you think that the misgivings of some deputies that it has not been possible to halt the politicization of the Army are justified?

[Morozov] I have heard these misgivings, and not only from people's deputies. These questions are also being raised among the troops.

Many people want to repoliticize the army. Sometimes this is done unconsciously and sometimes deliberately. Certain activists are also not devoid of mercenary aspirations.

The legacy that we inherited from the former Soviet Union and the difficulties in dealing with it are evoking in officers the thought that it is necessary to set about to solve the problems, and forcing them to seek out their own versions for extricating themselves from the situation by creating organizations of social protection.

For these reasons, in the summer of this year the question arose of setting up assemblies of officers within the army structures. I have already expressed my attitude toward them to audiences in Odessa and Lvov. The assemblies may in the collectives and unite officers at their place of service—battalion and regiment and divisional, army, and district command. There should be not just vertical subordination, and even less should there be free leadership organs for them. They should not be politicized or exert influence on cadre policy, or issue appeals and petitions, deliver ultimatums to commanders of the leadership, and so forth.

This is also my position with respect to the Union of Officers of Ukraine. I am grateful to the activists in it who helped me, and who after the formation of the Ministry of Defense helped all of us in uncovering instances of removal of state property and violations of legality and the principles of justice. But there are also excesses. In some places their influence on commanders has with time become even greater than the former political officers. A commander cannot exercise his qualities and right of one-man command if he is intimidated. It is not important which structures do this.

And unfortunately there are such cases. While pursuing good intentions, we are in haste to express our distrust in a commander with respect to some particular decree or appeal. In one such case, not, unfortunately, an isolated one, divisional commander Colonel N.A. Rystev was relieved of duty, while in another the commander of a division is afraid to make a decision on appointing a Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Necheporuk to the post for which he has been recommended. And there are other examples. I have demanded official reports from commanders about their decisions.

Of course, this kind of thing must not be. The rights and duties of a commander are defined by laws, statutes, regulations, and other enforceable enactments. It is another matter if they are imperfect; then it is necessary to submit proposals and change them, but again by legal means. Or if these standards are being violated. Then those who are obliged, I emphasize the word obliged, to exercise supervision over their execution—the higher commander and the procuracy—are not working as they should. And the serviceman is protected against their failure to carry out their functions of supervision through his right to complain and request an official report.

They may take exception to this; let them just try. This is the situation: Some of them violate, others fails to monitor, yet others do not complain. In this way we engender nonstate, unlawful organs of protection. And as a rule, apart from political struggle in fact they have virtually no protective functions.

Only compliance with legislative enactments on the mechanisms for their actions and the provisions in regulations of the Supreme Soviet and strict supervision of execution will ensure protection of the serviceman against unlawfulness. And this is the root of all our hardships.

It is the same with the housing problem. Until a start is made to implement the state program for providing housing, and with guaranteed state resources and funding, and I hope they forgive me for this, no committees or coordination councils or alliances or associations of unfortunate officers will resolve the problem. Their activity becomes mere political struggle, and the results once again will be statements and appeals.

There is a state basis for solving the Army's problems, and this is the guarantee for its full depoliticization.

Incidentally, the former prime minister, V.P. Fokin, promised a state housing program way back in January. Unfortunately, nothing encouraging has appeared on this subject in three months, nor even in 10.

We have been working on such a program based on the project for cottage construction, and we are resolving the problem by giving credit of \$200 million to the Ministry of Defense. I attach great significance to this.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Can you tell us about the kind of work system that the Supreme Soviet, president, and government of Ukraine have with an organ such as the Ministry of Defense, which is a new one for our state?

[Morozov] This is a very serious and proper question. In fact the Ministry of Defense is a new organ of state management; it did not exist earlier. And, naturally, the state structures do not have experience of working with it.

The first experience of this kind started with its birth in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. The parliament created a legislative basis both for the ministry and for the Armed Forces in general, and for military policy in an independent state. The work of the commission on matters of defense and national security was invaluable. There were many regular military people and reserve officers there, people with great experience of life and service. They prepared an unbelievably large number of documents for such a short period of

time, and they were of good quality. The Supreme Soviet often adopted them on their first presentation.

I received major support from members of the commission and an enormous number of people's deputies. A total of 323 of them gave me their trust and helped me to get settled in. It is probable that all your readers remember that from 3 September of last year through 3 January of this year, when the process of the swearing of oaths started and I started to appoint officers to posts in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, both *de jure* and *de facto* we had a defense minister in isolation. So that this was a particularly difficult period.

Subsequently the appointments were made and practical work was done to realize the legal basis for the creation of the Armed Forces.

Now there are many questions about procedure for the selection and appointment of officers to posts. From the first days I have not permitted one-man-command decisions on personnel issues. At first we set up a certification commission that included representatives from all the structures engaged in developing ideas on our own Armed Forces, and with the creation of the collegium of the Ministry of Defense the work of the higher certification commission started.

In December the president of Ukraine assumed the duties of commander in chief and defined the procedure for leadership by him. By the 12 December 1991 presidential edict, the minister of defense as commander of the Armed Forces was subordinated personally to the president with respect to the execution of his duties.

The president is constantly aware of the situation with respect to all the main issues of military development in Ukraine, and he guides it. Through the Defense Council and from my regular reports, he evaluates the state of affairs with respect to the planning and organization of the state's defense and the reforming of formations. The president is aware of the attitude of the officer corps toward decisions made in the government, and he knows about the problems of Army reform and problems concerning people in the Army. He regularly issues instructions on resolving them.

I can say that I am always able to report my conclusions to the president regarding the situation in the troops, and to submit my proposals and obtain explanations and advice.

You also asked about the government. Here it is more complicated. This is a sphere of specific, everyday, serious issues connected with supporting the Army and funding for it, that is, questions of life, and they are always more painful. The more so since a sickness has now infected the entire state, first and foremost the economy.

When we talked about state support for the Army at a level that obviates the need for organs of protection of its people against the state itself, this is exactly the sphere.

When we said that the state does not yet have the experience in work with the new organ—the Ministry of Defense—this is also here.

We must all understand that Armed Forces are an attribute of statehood, one of the signs of the presence of the state itself, and part of it.

Therefore, complete resolution of the Army's problems is a task for the government, and that means the top people, not the apparatus. The state maintains its own army and does expect from it any revenue for the budget, as some people erroneously think. By spending money received from the sale of equipment that is being cut back to pay over and above the plan for housing for the families of servicemen, we are spending money that for many years was not given to them but used always for new orders for equipment, of which, together with Europe, we are now bringing to a level of reasonable sufficiency.

There is no doubt that it is not only the families of servicemen that have suffered and are suffering; everyone is going short, and not everyone has felt that the state is concerned for him.

We react positively to the appeal to transfer tracts of land and funds for the needs of oblasts and cities from the sale of equipment into the economy. Moreover, for humanitarian ends we are establishing favorable conditions for gratis transfer, and we are providing material aid for collectives and individual citizens.

The preparations for winter are now being completed. They are being completed according to schedules rather than according to the actual state of affairs. People have not been provided with housing, and not all vegetables and fuel have been procured. No state orders have been set for them, and because of the price increases this year, we have already run out of money. There is no indexation of appropriations under Ministry of Defense estimates. Commanders who previously used to manage by "finding" resources to make repairs to the barracks and housing inventory, service premises, heating networks, and heating systems for work places and so forth have now been deprived of this possibility. But concern for people has not declined, and people understand that now it is difficult for everyone.

Although what are we to make of the fact that deliveries of fuel for the Army in 1993 allocated for the Ministry of Defense have been "taken over" by Ukrneftekhim [expansion not given]? Where is it being sent now? The picture is the same with foodstuffs, clothing and related gear, and medicines. I have therefore submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers a draft government decision on placing Ministry of Defense orders in the form of a state order for industry. These orders should be backed with incentives for enterprises and be controlled by the government.

In my opinion there should be a subdivision in the government that organizes support for the Armed Forces, the Internal Troops, the National Guard, the Border Troops, formations of the Ukrainian Security Service, and civil defense at the level of state programs and plans. It is necessary to reorganize relations between a Ministry of Defense client and the producer in the Ministry of Machine Making for the Defense Industry. A great deal of state money is being lost at the interface between the two spheres of order and production, and also at the interface between development and conversion.

Experience is needed, and this is gained in work. There is no end to the work, and the reorganization of the Cabinet of Ministers and its subdivisions once again requires enormous enthusiasm from people, particularly the volunteers. In general there is now great hope for enthusiasm until the

state structures begin operating reliably. As long as the enthusiasm does not wane during this time.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Konstantin Petrovich, in this connection, the question of personnel. Officers contact the editorial offices who, in their opinion, are being treated unfairly: They have sworn their oath but are not appointed to posts, and there are letters about delays in the conferment of promotions of rank....

[Morozov] Yes, I am aware of these appeals from my conversations with officers, and it is talked about when I receive people personally.

First, I am trying to look into the fairness of the decisions made by the certification commissions, and they are operating in the districts and armies. What are the reasons that an officer is not recommended for reassignment? And if any prejudice or unfairness is found, I shall issue instructions to correct the mistake.

Second, an officer should be considered for assignment to other duties for which he is suited.

But if this cannot be done—for there are abuses, and a low level of professionalism and personal qualities—then the question of his resignation should be considered. When this is done it is essential to consider his age and length of service, so that the person may have an opportunity either to change his skills and adapt for civilian life, or to serve some period “at someone’s disposal” so that he can qualify for a pension. In this case, of course, the housing problem should also be resolved.

Third, it is necessary to improve the work of the certification commissions. The most important thing is that the people in the commissions be honest and upright, as we say, professionals in military matters; and then there will be fewer mistakes.

There are delays in promotions. Formation of personnel organs and devising a mechanism for the passage of documents and control are, of course, no justification for this. People are waiting. So from time to time I intervene personally in this process and establish a date as an order in which draft orders for all submissions received should be submitted to me. The last occasion was 15 October.... And on 17 October I signed an order for 450 people. This is, so to speak, power regulation, and very soon we shall have the work organized, and an officer will be promoted without delays, as I promised: The order should be signed on the day when the period of service established in the previous rank has expired, and passed by telegram to the unit within one or two days.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] You were talking about a stressful work day. How does it shape up for you in terms of time and routine?

[Morozov] If I am working in the ministry, I usually arrive at 0830 hours. After the reports I immediately start to study the documents that have come in; there are usually a lot of them. I pass on the urgent decisions within the hour, and the rest in two or three hours. I receive deputies and administration chiefs. I have many visitors from among the people’s

deputies. Unfortunately, few of them come with constructive assessments or analysis of the situation, or with proposals. Most come with requests about the sale of equipment and property and the transfer of servicemen. I understand that this is necessary.

Well this is the routine, without the planned events among the troops and in the government, the Supreme Soviet, the Defense Council, the Security Council, and the Ministry of Defense Collegium, and without the official visits, reception of delegations, public events, travel, and so forth. When such events take place, a procedure is established for participation in them.

I usually go home between 2000 hours and 2030 hours, sometimes later.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] And, if it is not a secret, what is the salary of the minister of defense?

[Morozov] It is not a secret. It is 10,300. It was set by the Cabinet of Ministers. As a servicemen, I receive this for my rank and length of service.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] A final question. We would like to know how the people’s deputies regard you, personally, for they will soon be making a decision....

[Morozov] This is a question that interests many people. There have been attempts to organize so-called appeals from among the troops in support of the minister of defense; I categorically prohibited this. The Army should not be involved in this. Nevertheless, there were some, and then I telephoned the Supreme Soviet secretariat and even spoke with L.S. Gorev, so that they would pay no attention to them. I do not permit political struggle.

And the deputies.... I have many fine friends among them, whom I truly respect and like on a human level. There are also those with whom relations are “strained”.... Some accuse me of a “nationalist” bent, other of “pro-Russian views.” Both the former and the latter criticize, demand, and threaten resignation.

In my own work, I must maintain a balance between opposing opinions that affect the interests of people in the Army. The interests of all regions of our land are concentrated there. And these interests should be reflected in the activity of the politicians.

But the president and the Supreme Soviet will make the decision. I trust them, and they will decide what our Ukraine needs.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Thank you for the interview.

VUZ Program for Mandated Ukrainian Language, Area Training Outlined

93UM0098B Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Russian
20 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences K. Dyakonova: “The Ukrainian Language in the Establishments of Higher Learning”]

[Text] The Kiev Institute of Land Forces is taking an active position in complying with the Ukrainian SSR law “On Language in the Ukrainian SSR” of 28 October 1989 and in

implementing the directive "Ukrainian Language Instruction in the Ukrainian Ground Forces."

Explanatory work on compliance with this directive is being done by the university administration in a planned and purposeful manner. Ukrainian language studies have been organized for the preparatory courses for those enrolling at the institute. Those enrolling at the institute have had to take a compulsory examination in Ukrainian. A new department of Ukrainian studies has been set up.

From the 1992 academic year the courses "The Ukrainian Language and Literature," "The History of Ukraine," and "Fundamentals of Ukrainian Studies" will be taught in the colleges. The enterprising and energetic Lieutenant Colonel V.N. Sokrut, head of the department of Ukrainian studies, and Colonel A.P. Ogarok, institute deputy head for scholarly and scientific work, are bringing to all levels in-depth study by all military experts of the Ukrainian language as a guarantee for success in their subsequent military service in the Ukrainian Army.

The reorganized department of Ukrainian studies has been staffed with highly qualified teaching personnel (four docents, nine candidates of pedagogical sciences), and teachers from the Kiev State University, the Polytechnical Institute, and the Kiev Pedagogical Institute have been recruited to teach the Ukrainian language.

Lieutenant Colonels V.V. Ivanenko and S.P. Bekesh have done much work to explain the provisions of "On Ukrainian Language Instruction in the Ukrainian Ground Forces" (the newspaper NARODNA ARMIYA 26 May 1992).

Significant work in this direction has been done by the training section at the institute (headed by Colonel A.S. Kachalovskiy).

A schedule of Ukrainian language studies has been drawn up in good time for officers, warrant officers, and servicemen at the Kiev Institute of Ground Forces for the 1992-1993 academic year. According to this schedule the program includes 96 hours in groups 1 through 10, and 48 hours in groups 11 through 13. Almost all the subdivisions at the institute have become involved in the studies on a voluntary basis: the departments and faculties, the scientific research department and the scientific research laboratory, the course battalion and the TBOUP [expansion not given], and the institute administration.

There are studies almost every day for adults simultaneously in three groups in three auditoriums. All the conditions needed for successful study are there: The best auditoriums have been made available for this, including the administration's lecture halls and the library, and the library (led by V.A. Podgorets) and the methodological office (led by V.V. Chechetin) have been switched to organizational and methodological work for this. A permanent staff of teachers stands behind the groups being trained. Because the groups are oversubscribed, there is now a need to split them up into several subgroups and to seek out new possibilities, even recruiting fifth-year students from the Ukrainian branch of the Kiev Pedagogical Institute for this work (on a public basis, as teaching practice).

The library has acquired the following publications for those studying Ukrainian language: Z.M. Terlak and A.A. Serbinskaya's "The Ukrainian Language for Beginners," published

in 1992 by Svit in Lvov, and V.S. Kalashnik, A.Ya. Oprishko, and A.A. Svashenko's "Russian-Ukrainian Phrase Book," published in 1992 by Vishcha Shkola in Kiev. I would like rather to have acquired the three-volume "Russian-Ukrainian Terminological Dictionary," and also publications of the terminological professional dictionaries oriented on the military engineering profession.

The psychological-pedagogical department of the library has drawn up a thematic plan and annotation for training and television broadcasts in the Ukrainian language and literature for 1992. It is being proposed to show the premiers of the movies "Zaparozhskaya Sech," "Ustim Karmelyuk" and others on the UT-1 television channel. An exhibition of books and illustrations has been organized, called "Love Your Ukraine," at which historical and literary works of art of the Ukrainian classics are being shown. The thematic exhibitions "The Literature of Ukraine" and "Culture and Life" are now being put together in the library; they will exhibit materials from the periodical press about the latest things in Ukraine's cultural life (the librarian for the arts department is N.I. Klimenko).

Study of the Ukrainian language at the institute has many special features: Together with mastery of the grammar of the language, professional training is needed in the Ukrainian language. A teacher may not reduce study of the Ukrainian language merely to the study of rules and grammatical categories. The problem for a national military college challenges the students of philology with the special role of the humanities in the subject being taught, and its integration with other subjects.

This is evoking a certain consideration of the psychology of language teaching for adults with different features resulting from their age (memory, degree of perception of speech, hearing, sight, and so forth). This question arises: Do young people and adults master language in the same way? There is no simple answer to this question. Many well-known teachers have looked for optimal methods for work with adults.

Here is an example. During the course of World War II, the Holt method was used in American military training establishments. Holt built his system on the same basis as which children learn a language: First they hear words and sentences, they repeat them, sometimes not understanding their full meaning, then they listen to the pronunciation and begin to repeat it. Holt suggested that these ready-made models be repeated until they are remembered. Military people were "bombarded" with words and sentences in the foreign language from morn till night, six hours a day. In addition, loudspeakers were set up in the barracks that could not be switched off, and that continuously transmitted the same words and sentences. After nine months of this drill, the military people had basically mastered the language, could converse well, and were able to discuss complicated political and general subjects, and they could write a little; no psychological trauma was noted in them. The Holt system was transferred to the American universities and in somewhat altered form became to be called "the audiovisual system," and this completely supplanted the traditional method of reading and translation. The "audio-visual" system was widespread until the 1960's, until voices were heard saying that adult students wanted to see a more adult approach, in which initiative and their analytical

capabilities would lead over mechanism repetition of words, syllables, and sounds. Methods were changed, and questions about the difference between mastery of language by a child and an adult remained unresolved.

Today the situation has changed somewhat. Psychologists have devised new theories based primarily on the shaping of a need to study and giving due consideration to the psychological state of the student. It should especially be remembered that it helps no one when a teacher stands over him following every word and directing every step. The creation of a favorable atmosphere in a group and giving due consideration to the intellect, emotions, and physical condition of the individual promotes better mastery of a language.

On this plane, the experience of Georgi Lozanov is interesting. He believes that "science is not torment," and that there is no need to learn facts "by the sweat of one's brow" and to cram words into one's memory by rote. He has claimed that studying should be easy and pleasant. A person can learn several hundred words a day without difficulty or waste of time. The Lozanov method makes extensive use of music, pictures, flowers, games, gestures, and so forth—anything that encourages activation of more of the brain, which in traditional methods of teaching remains passive.

The teachers at our institute are also engaged in a creative search: how to conduct study sessions in the Ukrainian language for adults that are interesting, meaningful, and useful. Docent V.A. Chumak, senior teachers G.I. Volkotrub, V.M. Fedorchenko, and G.D. Kadzhibash, and teacher G.S. Yefimenko conduct Ukrainian language studies at the higher methodological level. For the first time in the battalion of course members at the training center N.K. Goncharenko is leading conversation in Ukrainian.

It should be noted that the problems connected with introducing the Ukrainian language into the training process are far from resolved. However, it can already be said that the organized process for learning the Ukrainian language that has been started is laying the foundation for the creation of a new higher educational establishment.

BELARUS

Defense Minister Kozlovskiy Interviewed

93UM0138A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Nov 92 p 1

[Interview with Col Gen Pavel Pavlovich Kozlovskiy, Belarusian minister of defense, by Col Gennadiy Miranovich and Col Valeriy Kovalev; place and date not given: "We Treasure Our Relations With Neighbors: Nine Questions for the Belarusian Republic Minister of Defense"]

[Text]

[Miranovich, Kovalev] Respected Pavel Pavlovich, it was not that long ago, when Belarus had just begun creating its own armed forces, that you could hear soldiers singing in formation during their evening promenade: "We remember those sacred words, 'Moscow is to our backs!', since the times of Borodino." This was welcome: It meant that Belarus was not yet on the wrong side of the front.... But what sort of songs are the soldiers singing today?

[Kozlovskiy] As we know, the Republic of Belarus is striving for the status of a neutral nuclear-free state. The independent course it is charting in military policy is, as I see it, a course of common sense. We are also striving to follow common sense in the difficult work of developing the military. Artificially accelerating this process, which is something certain hot-heads occasionally try to push us into, could only be a hindrance. This pertains both to the taking of the Belarusian oath by all servicemen, which I believe should be done conscientiously, and not under the pressure of emotions, and perhaps to other attributes, such as national symbols, the uniform and so on. The same also goes for the repertoire of soldiers' songs. They haven't changed much here yet. But because we are building our own army, it will of course have its own songs as well. And that's great, since national color will now be present in the repertoire of soldiers' songs. And anyway, is it really a terrible thing if some subunit sings a marching song in Belarusian? But everything needs time. Recently we thoroughly discussed this topic with Igor Luchenko, a famous composer and a Belarusian people's deputy. I think that our companies and battalions will have their own, Belarusian songs.

But as far as your mention of evening promenades is concerned, you can't take the words out of a song, as they say. Moscow is in fact behind our backs, geographically speaking. And if you are referring to political life, there will be no "front line" between Minsk and Moscow—I'm certain of that. We do want to be a law-abiding civilized state, after all. And civilized states must build equal relations with all neighbors.

[Miranovich, Kovalev] The Belorussian Military District, out of which the republic's armed forces are being formed, was international, as was true of other districts of the Soviet Army. Almost 80 percent of its officer corps was comprised of Russian natives. At the same time, more than 40,000 Belarusian natives (data from April of this year) are presently serving in the armed forces of other states. Many of them have already expressed their desire to finish serving on their native land. Is this circumstance affecting formation of the Belarusian army? And in general, what do you see as its, let us say, national countenance?

[Kozlovskiy] The army will be multinational, since it is manned on the basis of the republic's law on citizenship, which places all nationalities in equal conditions from the standpoint of the relationship to military service. At the same time because the influx of officers who are not citizens of the republic into our army has been shut off, the army's national composition has already begun changing in the direction of a larger proportion of Belarusian natives. According to our estimates by the middle of next year they will be around half of the officer corps.

To go on, as we know, we are trying to meet officers who are Belarusian natives and who have expressed the desire to be transferred to their homeland half-way, to the extent possible. There are around 10,000 of them at the moment. But there are many problems in this regard. The army is being reduced, you see. And one out of every three who wish to return to the republic is of retirement age, and over half are specialists in educational work and specialists in the air defense forces, of which we have no shortage. Most of them do not have any housing. Nonetheless, the process of their

return will continue. By the way, the Council of Ministers just adopted a decree transferring, prior to 1 January 1993, any servicemen who are citizens of the republic and any servicemen who retain the right to obtain Belarusian citizenship, from the republics of the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Baltics to the armed forces and to the internal and border troops of the Republic of Belarus.

In short, the army's national countenance will change. Still, we have no intention of forcing the process of its Belarusization, if I may be permitted to use that term. For example we will need six-seven years for conversion to Belarusian language. By this time graduates of our military schools will already have mastered their native language. Our own regulations, combat training programs, courses, manuals and other documents regulating the life and activities of the troops will also appear. For now, however.... For now, we don't even have typewriters with Belarusian script.

[Miranovich, Kovalev] It has been noted on several occasions in the mass media, including KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, that the process of establishment of the Belarusian army is going on without any unusual friction. But as we can already see, this does not mean that you don't have any problems at all. What is the biggest headache for the defense minister of the Belarusian Republic today?

[Kozlovskiy] Back in January of this year the Supreme Soviet and government of the republic worked out what from my point of view is an optimum, painless variant of taking the military oath—that it would be taken only by young privates. This has helped to preserve stability in the army. And now that the issue of requiring all servicemen to take the oath of allegiance to the people and Republic of Belarus has been placed on the agenda of the Supreme Soviet session, it is important not to arouse passions.

The drafts of laws on military issues presently being discussed in the parliament state that there should be no place for political parties and for movements pursuing political ends in the army. This is our fundamental position: The army must do its own thing. And the servicemen support this position. I had just attended an exercise conducted by our first mechanized brigade, which was recently formed. You know, I was happy to see the diligence and the enthusiasm with which the people participated in real combat work. And so it should be in the army—so that a tank commander is the commander of a tank, a baker is a baker, and an officer is an officer. I feel certain that with time, this is precisely what the army of sovereign Belarus will be—an army that is at full strength and well trained.

But let me emphasize once again that this will take time. For the moment we are having to put a lot of effort into problems of a different kind. Most importantly, we must not allow servicemen to suffer in their social welfare when the army is reduced. Just this year, we are faced with disbanding 182, reforming 107 and creating six new large formations, units and services. Around 7,000 officers and warrant officers will be cut. And if we consider that we now have 14,602 officer and warrant officer families without housing, you can imagine the acuity of this problem. We are drawing up our plans in such a way that those who are cut will be provided with housing, or they will receive loans to build their own. For those who have served 15 years, the government has already foreseen a minimum pension of 50 percent

of their pay during the period of the reduction. We are also solving the problems of retraining those we discharge, and finding jobs for them. A center for adapting and retraining reserve officers in the specialties with the most and best job opportunities will begin operating near Minsk on 5 January 1993. Such centers will also be established in other cities in the future as well.

[Miranovich, Kovalev] Military development in Russia clearly lacks a legal base at the present time, which is something many reproach parliamentarians for, and they anticipate something of a breakthrough in legislation on defense issues in the current session of the Supreme Soviet. How do Belarusian lawmakers measure up in this aspect?

[Kozlovskiy] If we abstract ourselves from the situation we could say that military development doesn't have enough of a legal base in Belarus either. Only now, in the fall session, will the Supreme Soviet adopt a package of basic military laws.

But if we estimate the situation comprehensively, in the time interval from December of last year to October of this year, it seems to me that it would hardly be suitable to force the events. As we know, maintenance of the unity of the armed forces during the time of the USSR's disintegration was a stabilizing factor. I believe that their fate was decided in most republics in basically the same way, in a balanced and gradual approach. Therefore it is only natural that military development in Belarus and, apparently, in other republics of the former Union as well, did not acquire concrete outlines until fall of this year. In this connection I am not one who believes that the parliament in our republic is being too slow in establishing the legal foundation for development of the armed forces.

[Miranovich, Kovalev] The Belarusian Armed Forces—are they a reality, or is this still just the Belorussian Military District?

[Kozlovskiy] From the standpoint of leadership of the forces and all of the other attributes of military service on the republic's territory, the Belorussian Military District no longer exists. At the same time, the armed forces are still in the stage of their formation. The transitional period of transformation of the Belorussian Military District into the Belarusian Army is tentatively to last until the end of 1994. Belarus was left with a good legacy. I am referring to the top-class modern equipment and the professional, highly qualified officer personnel. To this we should also add the rich combat traditions of the troops that absorbed the first blow of Hitler's war machine on 22 June 1941, that subsequently liberated Belarus, and that were the pride of the army in the postwar era. Now the armed forces in the republic are undergoing reorganization, and a transition is being made to a new organizational structure consisting of brigades and corps. Moreover we are reforming the staffs, the administrative organs and the central administration of the Ministry of Defense.

[Miranovich, Kovalev] As we know, the cost of the Belarusian Army in prices effective in April was 20 billion rubles. What sort of figures are you operating with today?

[Kozlovskiy] The cost of the army is doubtlessly growing in line with the increase in prices and the cost of living. Possessing a combat-capable, modern army is doubtlessly

an expensive pleasure for our republic. But the fact is that without it, we cannot establish our statehood. The government of Belarus has practically finished estimating its expenses for military needs. Over the course of one or two years it will undergo reduction in parallel with the reduction of the army, and as a result it will attain a sum that is optimum for the republic—not more than 10 percent of the state budget.

[Miranovich, Kovalev] Naturally the “military legacy” of the BSSR (72 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 10 combined-arms divisions, a separate air defense army, an air army and ground forces aviation) doesn’t fit the needs of sovereign Belarus. How do you think our army will look in the future?

[Kozlovskiy] From a practical standpoint it will look like this: By July of this year, as you know, we removed all tactical nuclear weapons from the republic’s territory. In accordance with an agreement with Russia, the seven-year timetable for withdrawing strategic nuclear forces will obviously be reduced. Belarus has categorically declared that it does not view states of the close and far frontier as potential aggressors. The force grouping that will be stationed in the republic after the process of reforming it is finished—something around 75,000 persons—will not be oriented on any particular neighboring country in its doctrine. Moreover Belarus is refraining from participation in military-bloc policy, regardless of what countries are brought together into a given bloc. With these general approaches in mind, the army will consist of three basic arms (ground forces, air forces and air defense forces), and it will be comprised of mobile, well equipped formations.

[Miranovich, Kovalev] In principle, the Belarusian Army has a good chance for becoming sufficiently equipped. In its “inheritance” from the Belorussian Military District, which was outfitted with the best models of equipment and weapons of those days, it received a reasonably good training base as well. But none of this lasts forever. In what way do you intend to restore worn equipment and replenish your arsenals?

[Kozlovskiy] We are currently working on the conception of material and technical support to the army. Some things we will produce here in the republic, utilizing the good potential of the military-industrial complex, which possesses an electronic profile, and some things we will buy elsewhere. We have signed an agreement with Russia on the principles of reciprocal technical and material supply of forces. My hope is that it will work as it should.

[Miranovich, Kovalev] And one last question, Pavel Pavlovich. What wishes would you like to extend to the collective of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in what are difficult times for all of us?

[Kozlovskiy] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is a fabulous military newspaper with great traditions. I would wish that it would serve as a consolidating military press organ. I would like it to publish more military theory in depth, and not overlook the progress of military development in the former republics of the USSR. Incidentally, your newspaper will continue to be read in our army—it will be delivered by collective subscription to all officers’ club libraries and enlisted

libraries. I know that many officers and warrant officers have personally subscribed to the “Star.” Such that you still have friends in Belarus.

Mechanized Brigade Formed From Withdrawn 11th Tank Division

93UM0147B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Nov 92 p 1

[Report under the rubric “From Our Information Bureau”: “Yet Another Mechanized Brigade Formed in Belarusian Army”]

[Text] The 11th Tank Division, withdrawn to Belarus from the Western Group of Forces this summer, has ceased to exist. Our correspondent Valeriy Kovalev reports that a mechanized brigade of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus stationed in the city of Slonim is its legal heir. On 10 November Col Gen Petr Chaus, deputy defense minister of the Republic of Belarus, presented the combat banner to the new formation.

This is the second mechanized brigade formed as part of the Belarusian army’s reform presently underway. The first, we remind you, was formed at the end of July. It is planned to create two more such operational-tactical entities in 1993-1994. Fully manned and outfitted with modern combat equipment, they will form the backbone of the Belarusian Ground Troops.

Belarus to Offer Servicemen Citizenship

93UM0147C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Nov 92 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Kovalev under the rubric “From Minsk”: “The Parliament of Belarus Gives Officers a Choice”]

[Text] After approving a new military oath and the deadline for administering it to personnel of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus a few days ago, the 11 November session of the Belarusian Parliament was forced to clarify an issue troubling many officers presently serving in Belarus. Not all of them are citizens of the republic, and the new oath begins with the words “I, a citizen of the Republic of Belarus....”

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus resolved the matter by granting officers serving in the republic’s military and expressing a desire to become citizens of Belarus the right to citizenship. In addition, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus was authorized to conclude individual contracts with military personnel who are unable to take the oath for whatever reasons.

Commenting on the decision passed by the parliament, Col Gen Pavel Kozlovskiy, minister of defense of the Republic of Belarus, announced to journalists that this “eliminates one of the most acute problems troubling the officers today,” since it does not put any of them on the spot.

BALTIC STATES

Estonian Self-Defense Forces Purchase Romanian Arms

93UN0303B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Nov 92 morning edition p 2

[Report by Leonid Levitskiy: "Romania Has Sold Estonia Defective Kalashnikov Automatic Weapons"]

[Text] The Estonian self-defense forces have purchased from Romania 4,000 Kalashnikov automatic weapons. The press has not mentioned the price. However, it reported that 250 of the weapons proved to be unusable.

All newspapers reported that Russia has prohibited the selling of weapons to Estonia. However, according to a quite high official, the blockade imposed by Moscow is not feared. Automatic weapons are available and, for the time being, in sufficient amounts. Pistols have been available in sufficient quantities for quite a number of years. They were procured by the customs officials for the self-defense forces. Customs confiscated a large shipment—15,000—Makarov pistols, allegedly sold by the Izhevsk Machine Plant to a British company. The deal was qualified as contraband goods. The Izhevsk people had filled the documents improperly: they had lowered the number of weapons by one-half and misrepresented their make.

This was the Estonian view. Representatives of the Izhevsk plant have denied it, but somehow quite timidly and vaguely. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had allegedly also tried to prevent the confiscation of either competition or Makarov combat pistols. Nonetheless, the weapons were confiscated.

CAUCASIAN STATES

New Minister of State for Defense on Return to Government

93US0079C Yerevan AZG in Armenian 19 Sep 92 p 1

[Report on press conference held in Yerevan on 18 September 1992: "Vazgen Manukyan: 'I Could Not Remain an Outsider: the Very Existence of Artsakh Is at Stake'"]

[Text] The question of Artsakh, creation of an army, of defense and military industry are questions which will be addressed by our former prime minister Vazgen Manukyan, who is now acting minister of state for defense. Yesterday at a press conference held at the Supreme Soviet conference hall, he once again recalled a statement he had made a year ago, that the Artsakh question is the key to our nation's future. At the same time he noted that he has no secret weapons which would lead to a resolution of the Artsakh question. Instead he underscored the importance of our nation's unity, first in reference to Karabakh and secondly in dealing with the issue of a national army. He noted, however, that the morale and psychological atmosphere existing in our republic does not favor it. Vazgen Manukyan repeated once more that we are not an ordinary nation and that we should be able to separate issues which are of a fateful significance to our nation from those which are of secondary importance. "We must develop a clear foreign policy," he said. And what is the reason for Manukyan's return? Is it a tactical step devised jointly with the President,

or is it an attempt not to carry the entire responsibility on one's own shoulders? In response to this question the minister of state brought forth certain comparisons and replied that there had been no games involved. It just happened that when he left the administration he was at that moment on the outside, among the opposition. But now he no longer can remain an outsider, because the very existence of Artsakh is at stake. Mr Manukyan also stressed the importance of the role he played in the Artsakh movement and noted that he must be able to carry out his responsibility to the very end. When asked whether this time he would have support, Manukyan answered that many sharp differences which existed between him, Levon Ter-Petrosyan and the HHSh [Armenian National Movement] at that time have diminished, and he hopes that part of the people and different parties, with whom he will be happy to cooperate, will support him. The minister of state also discussed in a self-critical manner the time he was prime minister, saying that "I blame myself. I should have been more decisive." As far as the present is concerned, he is getting ready to introduce qualitative changes in areas entrusted to him. Toward the end of the press conference, when talking about ties with the AZhM [Azhgayin Zhoghovrdavarneri Miut'yun (National Democratic Movement)], Vazgen Manukyan noted that the break is of a formal nature but that the National Alliance has not yet lost its mission.

Elchibey Speaks at Military Celebration

93US0108A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 10 Oct 92 pp 1-2

[Report on speech by Abulfaz Elchibey, president of Azerbaijan and commander in chief of the republic's armed forces, and other activities celebrating Armed Forces Day by AZERINFORM correspondents A. Amashov, Kh. Imanov, E. Sardarov, and G. Tagiyeva]

[Excerpt]

Heroic Azerbaijani Fighting Men!
Gentlemen Officers and Generals!
Esteemed Guests!
Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen!

Today is a remarkable day in the history of Azerbaijan. Seventy-three years after the first military parade of the armed forces of an independent Azerbaijani democratic state, in 1919, it is our good fortune to stage the second military parade of a national army. The continuers of the heroic and courageous traditions of the ancient commanders of Azerbaijan—Babek, Shah Ismail and Javad Khan—the creators of the armed forces of the independent Azerbaijani democratic state, General Samed bei Mekhmandarov, Aliaga Shikhlinksy, Ibragim Aga Usubov, and Ibragim Aga Velikov, led the first regular national army units for a military parade under the banner of Mamed Emin Rasulzade.

As you know, 9 October is Republic of Azerbaijan Armed Forces Day. The law "Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan" was enacted on 9 October 1991. The declaration thereof the day of the founding of our national army and the holding of today's parade are connected exclusively with this. Despite all the difficulties of our present life, we nonetheless made the decision to hold the parade. The people should see their army, of which they may be rightly

proud. The soldiers and officers, who will cross this square in march formation, will uplift the morale of the nation and compel enemies to tremble.

The armed forces of Azerbaijan are taking their first steps under conditions of arduous tests. Having risen to the defense of their ancestral homes and the villages and cities of their native land, the sons of the motherland have erected a reliable barrier in the way of specially trained Armenian mercenaries armed to the teeth. Azerbaijan's fighting men are being led into battle by duty to the fatherland, a feeling for their native land and fidelity to the just cause. History is once again showing that the individual defending a righteous cause is invincible.

We must today recall also the special militia detachments—regular armed formations which were the first to rise to the defense of Azerbaijani land. The fighters of these detachments were the first to repel the Armenian-Dashnak aggression in Upper Karabakh and the border areas, shielding our mothers and sisters, grandfathers and fathers. And it is right that it was they who had conferred on them first the honorifics of national heroes of Azerbaijan. There will remain forever in the history of Azerbaijan and will live eternally in the people's memory the names of such valiant fighters as Mageram Seidov, Ilgam Aliyev, Yuriy Kovalev, Mikhail Dzhebrailov, Vugar Guseynov, Mekhti Abbasov, Alif Gadzhiyev, Safarali Mamedov, Yusuf Aliyev, Nofal Guliyev, and Valekh Muslimov.

Irrespective of membership of this arm of the service or formation or the other, our first fighting men performed their duty with honor. Many of them died. May the souls of all our martyrs who gave their lives for the sake of liberation of the motherland rest in peace. *Gyabileri nurla dolsui.*

The army in our multinational state is multinational also. Lieutenant Colonel Shikar Shikarov, an Azerbaijani, Private Firuddin Shamoyev, a Kurd, Senior Lieutenant Fakhradin Musayev, a Lezgin, Captain Yevgeniy Karlov, a Russian, Tank Commander Albert Agaronov, a Jew, and Major Anatoliy Davidovich, a Belarussian, laid down their lives in the name of their fatherland—Azerbaijan. Gone to immortality, they gave a lesson in honor and dignity to some political demagogues. And on the fields of battle against the enemy hundreds of our brothers—Russians, Talysh, Lezgin, Ukrainians, and many others—are fighting shoulder to shoulder against the enemy.

The National Army of the Republic of Azerbaijan continues to take shape as a regular army. A qualitatively new stage of its organizational development has now begun. World military history teaches that victory is achieved not by number but by ability, organization and iron discipline. This principle has been made the basis of the creation of our national army. Nor is there any doubt that we have sufficient forces and potential. The main thing is to concentrate these forces and allocate them correctly.

An army is only an army when it has strong material and technical resources and is supplied with modern types of arms. It is important also that our people assume the burden of material difficulties pertaining to support of the army. Despite the difficult living conditions and the shortage at times of basic necessities, many of our people are prepared to give the army the latter.

The process of the creation of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan is an integral part of the building of an independent state. Our armed forces are being formed in observance of the principles of the UN Charter, the CSCE Final Act, the Helsinki Agreement of 1992, and other international rules of law.

The sacred duty of our armed forces is to organize the defense of the state of Azerbaijan against encroachments and provide for its security and territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders. The Azerbaijan National Army is being formed solely for defensive purposes. Its military doctrine is defense of the people.

The military potential of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan will develop in accordance with this doctrine and with regard for the economic possibilities of the state and will be built on the basis of the principles of defensive sufficiency.

Guided by the interests of the people, we will cooperate in the military sphere with foreign countries—Turkey, Russia, the United States, Britain, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the states of Central Asia, and others.

The creation of the Azerbaijan National Army contains an important principle—separation of the army from politics. Every soldier, every officer, and every general must serve merely one idea—defense of the motherland!

I appeal once again to the soldiers and officers of Azerbaijan today: Under these difficult conditions your exceptionally difficult mission is the organizational development of the army. May you not be stopped by the obstacles which you will inevitably encounter. You will meet on this path both injustice and people's wrongfulness. Be prepared for any difficulties and know that they are temporary.

Your sacred duty to the motherland is to master the secrets of modern military science, study new technology and preserve your weapons as the apple of your eye.

Armed forces are strong by their trained and convinced soldiers and officers devoted to the motherland. Our National Army must be a school of genuine valor, patriotism, and courage. Confidence is growing with every step taken that the wish will become reality. I wish you success on this long and arduous path.

Long live the armed forces of independent Azerbaijan!

[Passage omitted on other speeches and anniversary activities.]

Civil Defense Chief On New System

93US0140A Baku KHALG GEZETI in Azeri 22 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Captain Gulagha Babayev, chief of the republic Civil Defense Headquarters, by Eyyub Memmedov: "A Single System And Serious Supervision: Civil Defense Must Be Approached In Such A Demanding Manner In Our Republic"]

[Text] 31 July 1992 is the day that the Azerbaijan Republic formed an independent civil defense. On this day the president of the republic signed the order on proposing "Statutes On The Civil Defense of the Azerbaijan Republic." In the new Statutes a number of basic changes in the

republic's civil defense system were made, a stable leadership was given to civil defense, and their rights and duties were defined.

What do these innovations consist of in reality? What positive changes are expected in the republic's civil defense which had earlier been established under the aegis of the USSR Ministry of Defense and whose activity had never really been felt. How will the republic's civil defense become active under wartime conditions?

In connection with these questions, we turned to the head of the Azerbaijan Republic Civil Defense headquarters, Captain (I) Gulagha Babayev.

[Babayev] The presentation of the Statutes, above all, has put an end to the indeterminate situation of the republic civil defense system and strengthens its leadership. Now the republic president has implemented a general leadership for the republic's independent civil defense. The Prime Minister of the republic provides direct leadership over this sector, and bears the responsibility for being ready to perform the duties before civil defense.

With the goal of planning civil defense measures, organizing their fulfillment and supervising their execution, the Civil Defense Headquarters under the prime minister has been established and daily leadership of civil defense has been turned over to the headquarters chief. All state and economic organs, as well as every organization, institution and administration, no matter what the system of ownership, all responsible persons and citizens, must comply with the orders, directives and commands of the headquarters chief.

This structure derives from the necessity for a single leadership of civil defense because a complex of defensive measures must be prepared and the organization of the implementation of these measures and their supervision must be concentrated in one hand.

The leadership of civil defense is organized on the territorial-production principle; in other words, chiefs of the executive wing administer civil defense in cities, rayons and other administrative-territorial regions, and leaders of ministries, state committees, chief administrations do the same in their local organizations.

[Memmedov] But earlier the civil defense leadership merely assigned chiefs to these organizations.

[Babayev] Yes, they were assigned. Because of this they were not complete masters in this sector and bore no responsibility.

In the new Statutes this question is dealt with very seriously. Now the solution to problems pertaining to civil defense is included in the duties and obligations of the chiefs of the executive wing as well as the managers of ministries, state committees and local administrations, institutions and organizations, and thus they bear responsibility. This has special importance in strengthening defense work at a time when our republic has been drawn into a war and undoubtedly will basically revive the activity of civil defense organs everywhere.

[Memmedov] Since the conversation has touched on war, would you clarify one aspect to me: what kind of help are civil defense forces providing rayons where the war is proceeding?

[Babayev] When you say civil defense forces, what do you mean? Militarized or non-militarized forces? As for the former, that pertains to the special regiment of Civil Defense Headquarters. Its power is used to give operational help to the population and economy in special situations which would occur in times of war. For example, now there are special units of this regiment located in a number of border regions. They serve in rayons where war is being waged, and conduct work in territories where the enemy has used chemical weapons, and keep this sector under constant control.

These units identify all kinds of chemical poisonous substances and take operational measures against them. These units have enough specialists and technical equipment to clean up poisoned territory, equipment and military materiel.

I would remind you that the civil defense regiment must always be in a state of readiness in more secure periods to eliminate the consequences of natural catastrophes which could occur—earthquake, flood, storms, as well as major industrial accidents and fires. The staff of the regiment has taken part in many very serious accidents which have occurred in the republic, and have provided notable services. The regiment has everything necessary for rescue and restoration work.

Unmilitarized units of civil defense are organized by local machine operators and other specialists directly from the civil defense headquarters from rayons and institutions.

But I should explain that this work has not been well organized in rayons situated on the front lines. Thus, during urgent accident and rescue work in areas where there is much destruction, the army and police are also mobilized. There is no need to mention the great demand for these forces on the front. This is the result of the apathetic attitudes of local executive governments who are completely responsible for civil defense to do this work.

[Memmedov] You mentioned earlier that control over the execution has also been assigned to you.

[Babayev] Yes. There is no permanent representation of the republic Civil Defense Headquarters in the rayons. As for the temporary assignments of our specialists and officers to the rayons, this is not giving the necessary results.

[Memmedov] What about local civil defense headquarters?

[Babayev] They are under local organizations and all problems pertaining to civil defense must be solved directly on the basis of directives from the leaders of these organizations. Our goal is to strengthen supervision over their activities. Thus, we decided to establish interrayon regional (precinct) administrations of republic Civil Defense Headquarters in ten areas. Three to five officers and an adequate staff of private specialists will serve in each of these. It is only natural that under the present economic conditions in the republic, additional expense cannot be permitted; the regional administrations are only being established within our own internal possibilities.

[Memmedov] When will the regional administrations begin to operate and of what will their activity consist?

[Babayev] One can say that the basic preparatory work has been finished. Now we are engaged in staffing them. Soon

regional administrations will begin to function in the Genje, Jebrayyl and Aghdam regions. Shortly, we will also have completed work in the remaining regions.

[Memmedov] More than a month and a half have passed since the new Statutes were passed, and now how would you explain the inactivity of the local civil defense organs?

[Babayev] If we were to say that there had been no action, this would not be true. But, in most places no turning point is being felt. Civil defense measures which have been planned by republic organs are not being implemented in an organized manner; it has been disconnected to the extent that the work done cannot come to the surface. In other words, the rayon civil defense organs have still been able to take the situation into their own hands in providing leadership to a sector. This is most apparent in border rayons.

Unfortunately, despite its having existed for more than 30 years, one can say that there is still no clear description of its area of service of civil defense nor of its mechanism of implementing defense measures. This can be explained by the fact that civil defense propaganda has been poorly organized among the population.

Certainly, no one favors creating chaos or excitement about defense measures. No information is communicated in such talks. But to prefer silence is also a crime because excitement and uneasiness occur when people do not have the correct information about a situation which has come about or they do not know the principles of defense.

Such a false idea is created that the republic Civil Defense Headquarters have to be directly engaged in not only implementing civil defense measures but, in exceptional cases, defending the population and guaranteeing economic activity. The Statutes have put an end to such false conceptions. It states in Article 5 that the duties of civil defense will be fulfilled by the state government and administrative organs of the republic, unions and organizations, including institutions of all forms of ownership as well as responsible persons and citizens.

[Memmedov] At a time when the republic faces serious economic difficulties, how is financing this sector organized?

[Babayev] This is considered in the Statutes. Civil defense expenses are met basically through the internal possibilities of ministries, state committees, chief administrations and other administrations and organizations, no matter what their form of ownership.

[Memmedov] What are your relations with the International Civil Defense Organization?

[Babayev] We have established relations with the ICDO. We have translated its statutes and other major documents into Azeri. The participation of our delegation as observers in the ICDO has been resolved in principle with the help of the republic leadership. In the future, we are ready to cooperate in civil defense with neighboring states on the basis of mutual agreement.

Use Of Azeri In Military Education Promoted

93US0140B Baku AZERBAIJAN MUELLIMI in Azeri
23 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel (ret.) Teymur Hajyyev: "We Must Pay More Attention To Military Preparation"]

[Text] An army is one of the important attributes of an independent state. Despite the fact that our republic has been on the road to independence for only two years and despite that fact that our parliament only passed the decree last year, our national army is now in the process of being formed. The rather late establishment of the army in our republic, on whose soil a war has been going on for more than four years and which has been exposed to aggression by Armenian bandits, is tied to definite subjective and objective reasons. We are far from the idea to study these. But as a soldier I also join with those who defend the idea that years and a great deal of money are needed in order to establish an army with modern equipment and skilled personnel.

As in every sector, one has to begin in this work with the alphabet, in other words, with the military training of youth. We would explain that the military training of youth called into the army is extremely low. Whether our soldiers were drafted into the army after finishing secondary school or they had had two years of military service in the Armed Forces of the former USSR, many of them have not mastered the elementary rules of combat, weapons handling or the demands of the military code. This flaw, which is not apparent during peacetime, reveals itself on the front and on the barricades. The first reason for this is the unsuccessful teaching of elementary military training in the higher grades of our general education secondary schools. Until recently an attitude of indifference was shown in the selection and placement of the military leaders who were teaching this subject. Often, those bearing minor military rank, lacking specialized and pedagogical training, were simply taken out of the army and placed into this work. The fact that there was not a national program, textbooks, methodological aids, maps and charts, the fact that the necessary material basis (for artillery practice, etc.) was not created, the shortage of teaching firearms, the conducting of the instruction in Russian and other conditions, created the grounds for the poor teaching of this course in our schools.

The second reason is connected with the colonialistic policy furthered by Russian imperialism for more than half a century. It is known that at the beginning of the last century the Russian empire, which had annexed a part of Azerbaijan's territory, did not trust the Turks living on this land, did not call them into the army and did not put guns in their hands. Our misfortune was that there were those among our intellectuals and national leaders who considered this distrust a concession to the Turks of Azerbaijan. As a result of this "concession" the youth of Azerbaijan were deprived of the possibilities to be educated in military schools and serve in the Tsarist army. The desire of some of our talented youth, who were able to represent Azerbaijan in world military arts, remained in their hearts.

The empire, which changed its uniform and disguised its appearance in the 1920s, made a unique "correction" in its policy of the nationality minorities' participation in its military organization. Now Azerbaijanis, like those living in

other Turkic republics, were drafted into the army. But they were often sent to second-rate, auxiliary military units. By this rule, for more than 70 years a very small part of our youth served in fighting units of the Soviet Armed Forces and were not familiarized with military equipment; as for the majority, they did their military service in construction, repair, protection and fire units.

The situation was quite similar in admittance to military academies and higher schools. In answer to the few protests heard from the republics about such an attitude, it was claimed that they do not know Russian. In general, our leaders expressed not one protest about this situation. Military commissars of the Azerbaijan Republic participated in meetings devoted to questions of the preparation of youth and conscription into the ranks of the Soviet army twice a year by the USSR Ministry of Defense. At these meetings questions of conscripting Azerbaijan's youth into the ranks of the Soviet army were planned and resolved. But our military commissars did not once raise a voice of protest against our youth not being sent to fighting units or to important military schools.

All this impedes staffing our national army with skilled soldiers and an officer corps today. I want to make some recommendations as an experienced officer on a way out of the situation and for improving the work of training military cadres in the future:

—first, the responsibility of the committee of leaders responsible for preparing youth to serve in the Azerbaijan Armed Forces must be increased. For this:

- a) instruction must be in Azeri;
- b) a new national program on elementary military preparation must be put together and textbooks must be written;
- c) the publication of placards, displays, teaching charts and other items must be put in order;

—we have to create departments for preparation for pre-draft age youth and Civil Defense, and staff them with experienced retired officers.

—we must rebuild the military-patriotic work of youth, and give precedence to educating them about the integrity of our territory, the sacred nature of defending it on the basis of examples drawn from our heroic fighting traditions and heroes of the people.

It is to be appreciated that by order of the republic Minister of Education it has been planned to introduce a civil defense curriculum in the general education schools. This course must be taught by class leaders. But, we must state frankly, the class leaders are not ready for this. It would be good if short-term courses could be arranged in specialized institutes, and class leaders be trained in teaching this course.

One cannot conceive of elementary military training or army life without military regulations. In the transition period, the regulations and manuals of the former Soviet Armed Forces can be used. But in the future all military regulations must be rewritten in the mother tongue and our national characteristics be taken into consideration.

It is necessary to use widely the experience of the former Soviet, now the Russian, army which was and is one of the most powerful armies in the world in military training and

instruction. It would be useful if the military handbooks on the structure and usage of artillery weapons were translated and published in a large circulation, and the relevant placards and models were used.

In my opinion, the two higher military schools in Baku are sufficient to supply our army with highly specialized cadres for our army which is organized with the goal of defense. It would also be to the point to open an aviation faculty in the High General Forces Command School to meet the demand for fliers. As for the training of other cadres, as well as highly specialized soldiers, one can implement this in the military academies of Russia on the basis of a contract as well as in Turkey.

Making youth accustomed to the internal military discipline demanded by the army must be one of the basic duties—from the elementary military preparation taught in the secondary schools to the higher military schools.

We hope that the shortcomings and inadequacies in the system of elementary military preparation and the training of military cadres will be quickly eliminated and that our native Azerbaijan will possess an army which will be able to fulfil its duty with great professionalism in the near future.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Conflict in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast Widening

93UM0075A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Pelts: "Civil War Coming to Dushanbe?"]

[Text] I certainly do not wish to lay it on, so to speak, but reports emanating from Tajikistan tell of further deterioration in the situation. Armed conflict has encompassed the vast majority of the areas of Kurgan-Tyube Oblast. Especially violent firefights are occurring in the Vakhskiy and Bokhtarskiy Rayons, with the number of civil war victims abruptly rising in the past week.

More likely than not, the spreading flames of internecine slaughter will propagate as far as the capital of Tajikistan. As a matter of fact, there has been a marked increase in criminality in Dushanbe proper. It may be said that relative quiet reigned just a couple of weeks ago, but now sporadic automatic rifle fire is heard here. In the evenings, the once busy town is virtually lifeless. People are afraid to venture forth from their homes. Also unusually empty are the streets, since motor vehicle owners fear for their safety. There are valid grounds for such apprehensions. For example, the day before yesterday armed persons broke into an oil and fats combine and killed the chief bookkeeper. Although the incident is still being investigated, it is known that, along with political groups in Tajikistan's capital, especially active are Mafia-type structures who are taking advantage of the situation by "fishing in troubled waters."

To cope with the situation, the authorities are taking steps to maintain control, at least in the capital of Tajikistan. The decision was made on 22 October to employ motorized units of the republic MVD and National Security Committee to provide greater security on the major highways leading into Dushanbe. Patrols will travel the town's streets. We have been informed that the authorities have requested

the 201st Russian Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Dushanbe to join in on providing security for the more important municipal facilities.

Additional measures have been taken to protect Dushanbe from penetration by terrorist groups and cut the flow of weapons. An example of this is the creation of a buffer zone between Kulyab Oblast and Kochirinkhonskiy Rayon adjacent to Dushanbe for the stationing of Russian troop subunits to function as buffer troops. However, it should be noted that the Russian servicemen will man this buffer zone only after the opposing groups withdraw from that area. In this connection, we remind the reader that division subunits have taken up an intensive security watch at the Nurek Hydroelectric Power Station, Fakhrabad Pass, and a number of other significant facilities.

Armed encounters are also occurring on the Tajik-Afghan border, where Russian border troops are intercepting numerous attempts at smuggling in weapons from Afghanistan. Thirty Tajiks and 15 Afghans attempted the other day to carry a large amount of weapons into Tajikistan. Border troops worked with personnel of the National Security Committee and MVD of Tajikistan to foil this attempt.

Border troops are now being fired upon in Tajikistan proper. In one incident, on 21 October a Ural belonging to a border unit was hit by gunfire and burned up in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast. The driver and three border troops members were wounded. The Russian Federation Press Bureau reports that the condition of one of them is listed as serious. The gunfire came from a BMP. It was not possible to ascertain to whom the latter vehicle belongs.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Finnish Investment in Conversion Firms Sought

93UM0069A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish
4 Oct 92 p B 7

[Article by Heikki Arola: "Conversion of Russian War Industry to Civilian Production Does Not Interest Finnish Firms: Ekono Examines Possibilities of St. Petersburg War Industry"]

[Text] Igor Kliushchnikov, director of the St. Petersburg stock exchange, is trying to sell conversion to the West. This means he is trying to get Western firms to invest in Russian firms that so far have produced war materiel but now want to convert to civilian production.

While touring Finnish firms, Kliushchnikov noticed that it is not worth the trouble to make a sales pitch in Finland. Finnish firms impoverished by the recession do not want to invest in projects it would take years at best to launch and whose productivity would be uncertain.

The Russians, too, have focused their efforts elsewhere. So far the most promising contacts have been made with the Japanese.

In preparing for conversion and salesmanship, however, these people of St. Petersburg have enlisted the aid of the Finnish consulting firm Ekono. Together with the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange, Ekono is assessing the possibility of converting the St. Petersburg war industry to civilian production, and together they are marketing projects to Western countries.

Unfulfilled Hopes

In Russia many hopes are placed in conversion, but they are often unrealistic and unfulfilled.

For example, Finnish-Russian Economic Commission chairman and deputy prime minister Georgi Hizha is a dyed-in-the-wool conversion man whom it is hard to get to talk about anything else. He believes that with Western support conversion is the answer to nearly all of Russia's economic problems.

In Russia there is even the notion that in three years the entire war industry can convert to a new type of production with Western aid. The point of comparison is the United States, which after World War II converted most of its war industry to civilian production in two years.

Ekono's Klaus Arni considers such a comparison misleading. The biggest difference is the economy's infrastructure, which Russia almost entirely lacks. Building the infrastructure is more work than getting the firms themselves up and going.

After touring the St. Petersburg war industry firms, Arni thinks the most troublesome aspect of conversion is finding firms that have a realistic chance of switching from military to profitable civilian production.

The war industry plants in Russia are without exception conglomerates that produce everything possible. Even the directors of these conglomerates have no idea what kind of factories and products are found under the umbrella.

According to Arni, the only way to find out is to walk factory by factory through the conglomerate. Then the conglomerate must be split into smaller viable pieces that could conceivably interest Western firms.

The task is made no easier by the fact that up until now these conglomerates and war industry regions have been totally off-limits to foreigners and Western guests are utterly unfamiliar. The only possible language is Russian.

For Own Markets

In any case, Arni believes that Russia owns technology suitable for creating new products.

Ekono emphasizes to potential investors that the enterprises must focus on the production of consumer goods for Russia's own markets. This is the basis from which export products can be developed.

The St. Petersburg Stock Exchange (PSE) is involved because there are attempts afoot to privatize the conversion firms and have them join the stock exchange. Just a year ago, there were dozens of stock exchanges in St. Petersburg. Now there are six, and the PSE is one of the biggest.

Maslennikov of Tula Arms Plant Interviewed

93UM0077B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 1

[Interview with Tula Weapons Plant State Enterprise General Director Nikolay Dmitriyevich Maslennikov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Vorobyev, under the rubric: "The Defense Industry: What Isn't Said in the Advertisement": "Tula Plant Workers Know How To Make Weapons. Excellent Weapons"]

[Text] "Peter the Great. Founder of the Plant"—these words have been carved into the monument to Peter I which has been raised in front of the Tula Weapons Plant administration building. Peter the Great—with his sleeves rolled up to the elbow, in an apron, and with a smith's hammer in his hand. It seems that he will come down from the pedestal right now and the sounds of the smithy will ring out over the plant and the Tula Kremlin which is nearby...

[Maslennikov] We begin recording our history in February 1712 when Peter I signed the Ukase on founding the plant. Already in those times, water-powered engines—metal-removing machine tools—were being used at the plant. Our rifles, pistols and cannons brought success not only to Suvorov's troops. The glory of Tula weaponry was strengthened at the Battle of Borodino and in all subsequent battles.

The Tula weapons makers were state people—they were hired for the obligatory delivery of weapons for state matters. Public centralized weapons production existed which supplied weapons both based on individual orders for the emperors' entourage and retinue nobility, for gifts for foreign sovereigns and ambassadors, and also based on orders from the military department. That provided benefits for those people who forged the weapons. Right now we can only recall those ancient benefits. We are being forced to save even on salaries due to high taxes and the absence of the required monetary resources. But we are still striving to make ends meet. The fact that we are producing sports and hunting rifles besides military products helps a lot. We have

shifted to the production of spare parts for home appliances and even for children's toys with the retooling of military production. In the near future, we are preparing to produce gas pistols which we think will be cheaper than foreign-made pistols. We are preparing to produce a series of new sports and hunting rifles. Among them, we are examining the possibility of producing special weapons for farmers and militia workers. In a word, there are prospects. But we cannot get by without the sale of weapons and military equipment, that is the main source of resources for the reconstruction of production.

[Vorobyev] As I understand it, you are proceeding from the principle that the defense industry must itself earn the money for conversion?

[Maslennikov] Yes. No one will bring us money on a silver platter. Therefore, we can and must earn hard currency through the sale of traditional defense industry products, while taking advantage of our superiority over the West in this sphere.

[Vorobyev] So, it seems that you are continuing to produce weapons? I have heard that the warehouses are overflowing with weapons?

[Maslennikov] There was a certain period in the operation of our enterprise when an excess of military production had developed (artificially, of course). This was associated with a certain political uncertainty. For a long time, they could not decide at the highest levels: will we continue to sell weapons? During that time, the Americans, not standing on ceremony, seized all of the new (including ours) sales markets. Right now the question of arms and military equipment sales is being resolved. So, we will be able to sell all remaining military equipment in the very near future.

[Vorobyev] And yet, Nikolay Dmitriyevich, to what degree has the production of military equipment been halted? And which items?

[Maslennikov] We have actually begun to produce less military output but we have thereby increased its quality. As for special items, we will attempt to talk about them through your newspaper and to thereby attract foreign purchasers.

They are—an automatic grenade launching system that consists of a Kalashnikov rifle with a grenade launcher mounted under the barrel. Its effectiveness has been verified abroad and the nearly simultaneous destruction of the enemy using automatic fire and grenades is especially valuable in defensive and offensive engagements for soldiers-border troops, seamen, and assault troops.

Everyone knows, military people in any case, about our "Konkurs" [Competition] (9M113) guided antitank projectile. It can be a threat for any armored targets. The projectile pierces 600-mm armor plate. It has a high degree of range for this type of weapon—4,000 meters.

[Vorobyev] Excuse me, Nikolay Dmitriyevich, but I can imagine what embarrassment these combat specifications can cause, as we are accustomed to say, for a simple person. Really, he can think, are we still planning to fight with someone?

[Maslennikov] I understand you but let's think about what our enterprise has been called upon to do and what it is called upon to do. "Konkurs" projectiles are primarily a

defensive weapon. The Russian Armed Forces need them and I don't think that other countries will reject them. It is a matter for politicians to define military doctrines and to whom and which weapons to sell. But I personally have no doubt whatsoever that we will need defensive weaponry and military equipment until it disappears from the earth.

It is indisputable that all weaponry must be under state control. But then again, I once again want to appeal to the politicians who have been elected by the people—it is their lot to adopt a law on arms sales and to also define effective mechanisms to carry it out.

FROM THE EDITORIAL STAFF. We are beginning to publish a series of advertisements that describe Tula Weapons Plant's products with today's issue (on page 4).

Rebrov Visit to Arzamas-16

93UM0157B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Mikhail Rebrov, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Three Generations of Bombs: Only Now Can We Talk About the City Where They Were Born."]

[Text] For many long years, everything associated with nuclear weapons was surrounded by an aura of secrecy. Even today you will not find on a map the city where they made the first atomic bomb. It is understandable what considerations were taken into account when the super-secret, special-purpose installation was being created. The history of the closed city and the stories about the fates of the people living in it and the nuclear arsenal being created by them are yet to be written. This is merely an initial acquaintance.

Arzamas-16, or the Secret of City "Zero"

The train bound from Moscow, with the car couplings jingling, stopped at the checkpoint. In the different autumn colors of the forest I saw the rows of barbed wire which separated the "can" from the "cannot," our conventional world from the atomic world. An asphalt ribbon could be seen beyond the fence and the control zone. It stretched along the railroad bed and then disappeared into the forest. Somewhere there was hidden the "most closed" city Arzamas-16—a city of legends and secrets, a forge of atomic weapons. It was here that the first Soviet atomic bomb was created, and the first hydrogen bomb. Today, too, they are perfecting and creating... However, that is the topic of a separate conversation.

A check of documents and travel orders, the receipt of passes ordered in advance, and only then, escorted by the employee of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center, do I get into city "Zero," whose past and present is highly classified.

Arzamas-16 is its name today. Its very first name was "Obyekt" [Installation]. Then it was called "Volga Office No..." (112, it seems). For mail items it was called "Moscow-300." Somewhat later, the city was named "Kremlev," and then Arzamas-75. The number corresponded to the number of kilometers from the real Arzamas. However, it was pointed out to someone that the number discloses the location, and that is why they gave it a different number at random. The train which runs here from Kazanskiy Station is listed under the number "80" on the schedule with a final

destination of Vereshchino. From this same Vereshchino via two legs and you are thrust into the fence of the "zone."

Two people selected the place for the secret installation: Yuliy Borisovich Khariton (he was first appointed the scientific director of the project and then of the entire program for creating nuclear weapons) and General Pavel Mikhaylovich Zernov (he headed the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics and the former KB-11). That was the spring of the first year after the war. They traveled through the environs, sometimes by motor vehicle and sometimes by horse-drawn transport. Three factors determined the selection: it was no closer than 400 km to Moscow (Stalin imposed this condition); the wooded expanse where one could "hide;" and the small plant which produced shells for the Katyushas could become somewhat of a mechanical base. Vannikov and Kurchatov approved the selection, and energetic work began to build and equip laboratories, recruit people... The first laboratory was housed in one of the buildings of the Sarovskaya Desert Monastery. A staff of 70 scientific associates seem huge during those times...

Today the city and "industrial zone" are separated. The road vectors were scattered along the wooded areas for many kilometers. Work zones and experimental complexes are usually called "areas." Each has its own "fence," its own "tracking zone," its own guard towers, and panels with warning and restriction signs. All crossings from zone to zone are categorically prohibited. Sometimes one does not know what his neighbors are involved in, and conversations are not conducted on the streets or on the buses. One can leave the city only with permission, after being given a pass.

Some might say that all this is not very much in keeping with the "principles of a democratic society." No need to slobber on the "topic." In America such installations also are not open to everyone. Everyone has secrets, and all developed states safeguard them. The city where they make third-generation atomic bombs cannot live and operate without special conditions.

Arsenal "Certificate"

I also had the opportunity to see the nuclear arsenal which was being created at Arzamas-16. Each bomb and warhead had its own information "certificate": date of testing and entry into the inventory, warhead yield... I also learned another thing. The first series-produced aerial bomb, thanks to someone, was named "Tatyana." The design and technical documentation say "Item No ...," but in all the discussions it is "Tanya" this and "Tanya" that. No one can remember why, but another thing is known for sure: adopting a 30-kilotonne equivalent of "Tanya" into operational service made it possible to reduce the numerical strength of the Army by 2,400,000 men. This was 1953.

That same year, the world's first hydrogen bomb was born with a yield of 400 kilotonnes. Later came the thermonuclear warhead for the intercontinental missile. Its yield was calculated at three megatonnes (mega means million). Is this large or small? Here are some figures for comparison: all the grenades, mines, shells, torpedoes, and bombs detonated during World War II had a total yield equal to three megatonnes.

Arranging nuclear weapons by generation is somewhat arbitrary. If what we have been talking about is considered as the first generation, the "second technological breakthrough" (that is what Academician Yu.A. Trutnev called it) dates to 1955. A new design of thermonuclear weapon was tested that year. During the testing it turned out that the activation time differs from the calculated time by one ten-millionth of a second. When Yu.B. Khariton said this in a report at the Kremlin, his report evoked laughter. However, Yuliy Borisovich [Khariton] was not in a cheerful mood. He understood how important these fantastically small differences could be and what effect they could have on the reliability of the device.

The next generation required new theoretical studies, new design solutions, and new preciseness. I did not see the third-generation bomb—I am not supposed to see it. It is taboo for now. But, as far as possible, I was interested: What qualitative changes did it draw into itself? And generally I understood. As academician Lieutenant-General of Aviation Ye.A. Negin explained, the yield has more than doubled, and the weight is one-hundredth of what it was. Other parameters have also changed. In the words of Academician Yu.B. Khariton, it has "many subtleties and much elegance."

Travel Through the "Zones"

Academician Sakharov (a memorial plaque has been installed on Building No 8, where he lived at Arzamas-16) once remarked: if the main secret of the atomic bomb was that it can be made, the uncovered secret of the weapons of Star Wars and the so-called SDI is that they should not be made.

...A missile with a nuclear warhead moves towards the target. It would seem that everything is calculated and checked. But what if it were to encounter an "obstacle" en route, say it were attacked by a hail of fragments, if a laser beam were to "illuminate" it, if it had to cross a zone of a nuclear explosion or experience a shock wave? And this is by far not all the "ifs" on which the behavior of a warhead may depend.

A rail track geodetically checked with the greatest accuracy stretched out for three kilometers. The deviation on this track must not exceed 3 millimeters. Rocket engines accelerate the warhead to escape velocities, after which it flies over a low-angle trajectory. Ahead is a 100-meter pipe six meters in diameter. Various tests also await the warhead here.

The first deputy chief designer, Doctor of Technical Sciences Yuriy Ivanovich Faykov, shows the unique multipurpose testing complex that makes it possible to measure a great number of parameters (up to 200), record high-speed processes, obtain the necessary result, and thus save funds for perfecting "products."

There is no alternative to such a complex. Testing in a wind tunnel cannot produce the necessary effect. Here highly sensitive instruments record parameters which are impossible to obtain even during flight tests.

This is the first time a journalist has been at the testing facility, and he is admitted generally unwillingly. I thought: "You will not hide the long path of the test range from the 'eyes' in space." And I could not help but ask the question.

"The essence is not the path itself, but the methods of testing," Faykov answered evasively. "Moreover, by knowing the 'schedule' of the overflights by foreign satellites, we can compile a work schedule so they do not coincide."

It was a 15-minute trip to the "laser cross." That is what they call the laboratory building where the "Iskra-5" unit has been assembled. Its 12 laser systems generate 12 powerful light beams which, converging at one point, squeeze a target in order to start a thermonuclear reaction. The idea itself is surprisingly simple in concept, but quite complicated to implement and can lead any uninitiated person to despondency. You see, to obtain a controlled fusion reaction, it is necessary to heat up ionized (or "electronized") gas to a temperature of hundreds of millions of degrees and keep it in such a state for a specific time.

The target is a thin-walled glass sphere with hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium inside. The diameter of the sphere is 0.5 mm, and the thickness of the wall is microns. Imagine with what accuracy the focusing must be accomplished.

On the various floors of the "cross" are capacitor banks most unique in power, amplifiers, mirror reflectors, lenses... The primary beam covers a 250-meter path in order to amplify the pulse 100 times.

Construction of the building required observance of special norms: "breathing" of the structure, a turn of the "wings" by only a centimeter, the nature of work at adjacent facilities—all this can affect the course of the tests and experiments.

Valeriy Tikhonovich Punin, chief of the department of lasers for thermonuclear research, is in love with his brainchild.

"We created our own gas laser (they named it 'Serafim'), a complex design of the Iskra, developed methods, and experimentally proved that we could initiate the reaction. The question is how to obtain high efficiency."

The center's theorists creating the weapons are working on problems of energy. You see, the basis of the hydrogen bomb—thermonuclear fusion of light nuclei—and energy of the future is the same. Besides the Iskra-5, there are only three lasers in the world that can be ranked together: the American Nova, the Japanese Gekko-12, and the French Phoebus.

One day administrators of economic organizations visited the laboratory. Amazed by what they saw, but not understanding much of it, for a long time they did not dare to ask a nagging question (this was during the events in the Persian Gulf): "Will this thing reach Iraq?" Such a thought seemed amusing to Punin, but he was not about to disappoint the guests: "If it has to, it will."

The testing area of the explosions department here is called "Area No 19." The department is headed by Professor Stanislav Aleksandrovich Novikov, doctor of technical sciences. He talked about how they test parts of the "product" for G-loads. This is done with the help of a special "cannon" that creates 10,000 G's (!) for weights of 250 kg. Incidentally, the word "cannon" cannot be said openly. A gun from a shore battery of Port Arthur is also used for the tests. This

28-meter hulk, made at the beginning of the century at the Obukhovskiy Plant, is able to hurl projectiles weighing 1.9 tonnes.

The "philosophy" of nuclear security is simple and harsh: if you lag behind, expect an imposed settlement. The "scheme" is roughly like this: scientists make the discoveries, designers, engineers, and the military turn them in to weapons, politicians try to agree not to use them, and meanwhile scientists make new discoveries...

Decree on Use of Eliminated Missile Complexes

93P50019A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
11 Nov 92 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Missile Complexes Have New Purposes"]

[Text] Having spent in the past hundreds of billions of rubles for weapons, Soviet industry created an enormous missile potential, a part of which is slated to be destroyed according to the international obligations undertaken by the Russian Government. An important part of the missile weapons can be used for peaceful purposes, being used rationally on behalf of the economy and the population.

Taking account of such a possibility, the Russian Federation Government adopted on 22 October 1992 a decree "On the Rational Use for the National Economy of Missile Complexes Subject to Elimination in Connection With the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons."

The decree envisages the use of rocket motors and guidance systems after their reworking with the goal of using them for commercial launches of space vehicles for Russian and foreign firms. Part of the disassembled launchers, assemblies and materials are slated to be used in the national economy and for export. The "Missile-to-Housing" project envisages re-equipping the territory of launch complexes under farm management and the construction of housing for armed forces officers.

The government has accepted a proposal from interested ministries and agencies to involve several associations and joint-stock companies in the work to create commercial space-rocket systems on the basis of using missiles subject to elimination and to carry out the "Missiles-to-Housing" project.

The financing of this work, which is planned to be carried out mainly in 1993-1994, will be covered in part by allocations from the Russian Federation republic budget. Profits from carrying out the project will go to the construction of housing for armed forces officers and for the scientific-technical servicing of the work of utilizing missile complexes and converting defense production

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Commentary on Pending Elimination of NATO Nuclear Planning Group

93UM0079A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Manki Ponomarev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "It Seems the Nuclear Planning Group Is Passing Into Nonexistence, but Not the Plans"]

[Text] Just relatively recently, in May of this year, Reuters Agency made the gist of a highly classified NATO document, MC-400, public property. It set forth basic provisions of NATO military strategy for nuclear and conventional armed forces. In particular, it stated unequivocally that the alliance "continues to view nuclear weapons as weapons of possible use." As a factor of deterrence, they continue to be the basis of all bloc strategy, which does not exclude the possibility of first use of such weapons. The document contains recommendations on delivering strikes against the most important military targets on enemy territory either by nuclear bombs or sea-launched missiles.

Very little time, less than a half-year, has gone by since then, but the world situation is changing so swiftly that this document already is hopelessly obsolete. This is shown convincingly once again by results of a two-day session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group which ended Wednesday. Ministers of defense of 14 alliance countries (France, which left the NATO military organization, and Iceland, which does not have its own armed forces, do not participate in Nuclear Planning Group work) who gathered in the small Scottish city of Gleneagles discussed an unusually large number of questions. And some were by no means within the competence of a group whose primary function up until now was to manage the North Atlantic Alliance nuclear arsenal.

For example, plans for strengthening security in Europe and proposals relative to possible use of bloc forces for settling crisis situations, above all in former Yugoslavia, were examined in Gleneagles. NATO intends to send 5,000 servicemen there and set up its headquarters 30 km from the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. The ministers also agreed to activate a search for ways of stopping the bloodshed there. It is planned to involve states which in the past were part of the Warsaw Pact in normalizing the situation in Yugoslavia.

Other problems connected above all with allocating funds for NATO, which is experiencing a certain crisis in this area, also were not ignored. U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney informed his colleagues about the decision of the American Congress to reduce financing of NATO military bases and systems of lines of communication in 1993. The problem of the "Eurofighter," whose creation many consider no longer pertinent and excessively costly, also was discussed. Germany, for example, refused to participate in this project, whose implementation will require £22 billion. Agreement just was not reached here.

But all that is so, incidentally. Unquestionably, the question of the future of nuclear weapons in Europe and bloc nuclear strategy was the most important.

It is common knowledge that all tactical nuclear weapons of the former USSR were transferred to the territory of Russia long ago and are under strict control. The number of such weapons in NATO states also has been reduced by 80 percent (by the early 1980's their nuclear arsenals in Europe numbered 5,000 weapons). The United States finished withdrawing its tactical nuclear weapons—artillery shells, short-range missiles and depth charges—from other countries by July of this year. Now only tactical nuclear bombs belonging to the United States and Great Britain remain on the territory of eight NATO countries. Their number will drop to 700 by the middle of next year.

On Wednesday the ministers of defense of NATO countries agreed to rescind previous directive instructions on use of nuclear weapons against member countries of the former Warsaw Pact in case of war. "From now on our nuclear weapons will no longer be targeted against any specific state," declared Germany's Minister of Defense Volker Rühle. "The likelihood that NATO will have to resort to nuclear weapons at some time has sharply decreased."

Session participants agreed on new directives under which "a small number" of nuclear weapons will be stationed on the territory of European countries belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance "as a political guarantee of peace." But this does not mean that NATO fully excludes the possibility of using them. And the new instructions provide for using nuclear weapons, albeit on a limited scale, to stop a conflict, and without waiting for the enemy to use such weapons, i.e., still first use.

"The previous enemy no longer exists, but new thinking is in no hurry to become established everywhere," noted the German newspaper KOLNER STADT-ANZEIGER. "The situation carrying a threat for Western Europeans has disappeared. . . . Then why is it necessary to continue to hold to the principle of first use of nuclear weapons?" A fair question.


That in short is the essence of decisions made at the two-day Nuclear Planning Group session. The decision just made in Moscow to extend the Russian moratorium on nuclear weapon tests until 1 July of next year cannot help but have influenced its work. The entire present situation bears witness that the former nuclear strategy of the North Atlantic bloc has become an anachronism. Therefore no one was especially surprised when western information agencies announced that the 52nd session of the Group held in Gleneagles essentially was the last. It is proposed to transfer its functions to the NATO Military Planning Committee, whose next session is to take place in December.

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